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Abstract
Recent research tests and finds support for the hypothesis that an increase in the number
of elected representatives in local governments can reduce public expenditures by improving the
oversight of the mayor by the council. This result suggests that a system of checks-and-balances is in
place at the lowest level of governance in established democracies and is consistent with theories of the
role of division-of-powers in improving government accountability. Given the relevance of this result
for our understanding of political institutions, this dissertation presents three essays that: 1) test this
hypothesis using different samples and alternative measures of government performance and 2) revisit
the evidence from the existent literature. The first essay tests the hypothesis by implementing a
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design using data from a large panel of local governments in Colombia,
South America. I find that additional representatives decrease government expenditures on average;
however, there is no evidence that this increase affects the oversight on the mayor. The results persist
after accounting for the number of parties with elected representatives, indicating that the estimates
are not driven by changes in the party composition. There is also no evidence that the reduction in
municipal expenditures affects the provision of services such as potable water, student enrollment in
elementary and high school education, and provision of health care to the low income population.
Given the findings from the panel of municipal governments in Colombia, the second essay revisits
the two empirical studies that report support for the hypothesis. A common feature of both studies
is that they present their estimates of the effect of council size as coming from a RD specification.
However, after examining the estimated equations, I show that they are inconsistent with a RD design
because they do not incorporate information about the data generating process (i.e., discontinuities
in the treatment assigning variable). The data from both studies is then used to estimate the effect
of changes in the number of representatives using an appropriate RD specification. I find that the
parameter estimates from the appropriate RD specification fail to reject the null hypothesis that
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a change in the number of representatives does not affect the oversight of the manager/major by
the council. The last essay provides an additional test for the hypothesis that an increase in the
number representatives can increase the oversight of the executive by the council using a panel
of municipal governments from Costa Rica. Although this panel is smaller than the one from
Colombia, it better represents local governments in many developing countries where municipalities
have a limited number of responsibilities with most services being provided through the central
government. Using a RD design, I find no evidence that an increase in the number representatives
has an impact on fiscal efforts or the allocation of municipal expenses. This is in spite of the fact
that changes in the number of representatives lead to an increase in the number of parties in local
councils.
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Chapter 1
Do more representatives improve
governance? Evidence from local
governments in Colombia
1.1 Introduction
The notion that the number of elected representatives affects the size and the allocation
of government funds features saliently in the economics and political science literature (Buchanan
and Tullock, 1962; Weingast et al., 1981; McCormick and Tollison, 1981; Persson and Tabellini,
2002; Primo and Snyder, 2008). Specifically, in an effort to test theories of distributive politics, the
majority of the empirical literature has focused on estimating the effect of the number of repre-
sentatives on the size of government. However, the results from this literature are equivocal, with
some studies finding a positive effect of the number of representatives on government expenditures
(Gilligan and Matsusaka, 2001; Baqir, 2002; Bradbury and Crain, 2001; Bradbury and Stephenson,
2003; Egger and Koethenbuerger, 2010), some finding a negative effect (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012;
Garmann, 2015), and others finding no effect (Baskaran, 2013).
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015), for example, find evidence suggesting that
an increase in the number of representatives reduces government expenditures by increasing the
oversight of the executive. Their results are based on local governments in Finland and the German
1
State of Hesse where the number of representatives is allocated as a step-function of population.
Using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design, both authors found that an increase in the number
of representatives reduces public expenditures in those categories where the executive (e.g., manager
or mayor) has more discretion.
Their results might have implications for improving the accountability of public officials in
local governments, as they suggest that an increase in the number or diversity of representatives in
local councils may strengthen the division of power between the executive and the council. This
paper further tests this hypothesis by estimating the causal effect of an increase in the number
of representatives on public expenditures, fiscal efforts, the probability that the executive faces
prosecution, and the quality of public services at local governments.
I use data from municipalities in Colombia, which are administered by a council of repre-
sentatives and a mayor, because local governments in developing countries are often considered as
dysfunctional due to corruption or to low levels of human capital. Moreover, Colombian municipal-
ities are an ideal subject for testing my hypothesis because (a) there is a strong division of power
between the mayor and the council, and (b) the municipalities provide or assist in the provision
of basic services such as potable water, elementary education, and health care. Additionally, these
governments rely on intergovernmental grants from the central government which has been shown
to be conducive of lower levels of accountability relative to circumstances when a high proportion
of the revenue is generated from local taxes.
A central concern in estimating the causal effect of the number of representatives on govern-
ment outcomes is the possibility of omitted variable bias. For instance, unmeasured voter preferences
might affect political institutions (e.g., size of political bodies) as well as government policies and
outcomes (e.g., government expenditures and type of services provided) (Acemoglu, 2005). Another
concern is the possibility of reverse causality since a larger public sector may require a larger number
of representatives due to an increase in the complexity of public finances (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012).
This paper addresses both of these concerns in the following ways. First, the data come from
a large panel of 985 Colombian sub-national governments (municipalities) over the period 1998-2014.
Because for the most of Colombia’s history municipalities had little independence from the central
government, the political and administrative organization evolved in a similar manner across mu-
nicipalities limiting the possibility of time-invariant institutional characteristics driving the results.
Second, it exploits the fact that the number of representatives in Colombian municipalities is deter-
2
mined using a step-function of population and implements a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design
to estimate the effect of the number of representatives using municipalities in the neighborhood of
the population thresholds.1
My results indicate a negative effect of an increase in the number of representatives on
government spending. Specifically, I find that municipalities to the right of a population threshold
with two additional representatives have average total expenditures that are approximately eight
percent lower than those of municipalities to the left of a population threshold. This result is
consistent with the findings of Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015), and runs against
the common-pool problem and pork-barrel spending hypotheses where an increase in the number of
representatives leads to higher levels of spending (Weingast et al., 1981).
More importantly, I do not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that an increase in the
number of representatives improves the oversight of the mayor by the council. While I find some
evidence that municipalities to the right of the population thresholds spend less in categories of
expenditures where the mayor has more discretion, these expenditures are too small a fraction of
the budget to explain the reduction in overall expenditures. Additionally, I find no evidence that
the increase in representatives affects the probability that the mayor faces disciplinary prosecution.
However, this result is consistent with both a case where more representatives do not lead to greater
oversight of the mayor and a long-run equilibrium where mayors adjust their behavior to greater
oversight by the council.
I also find that the reduction in municipal expenditures is driven by a decrease in revenues
from intergovernmental transfers and not by higher fiscal efforts or a reduction in the municipal
debt. When examining the effect of an increase in the number of representatives on the different
sources of intergovernmental grants, I find no evidence that the reduction in total revenues is driven
by just one source. The fact that no single source of transfer accounts for the reduction in total
revenues lends credibility to the RD design because it suggests that the effect is not due to con-
founded treatments. For example, if I observed that the reduction in total revenues was driven by a
reduction in revenues from natural resource royalties or a reduction in central government transfers
for operating expenditures, it would imply that not only council size but perhaps the policy deter-
mining the allocation of these resources was also changing at the population thresholds. Rather, the
1Other studies relying on the use of population thresholds to identify the effect of number of representatives include
Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010), Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), Garmann (2015), and Cepaluni and Mignozzetti (2015).
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results suggest that the mechanism driving the reduction in expenditures might be a decrease in the
council’s ability to capture funds from other government branches, for instance, if an increase in the
number of representatives leads to higher coordination or decision-making costs.
To test if the reduction in expenditures affects the provision of public services, I estimate
the effect of the increase in the number of representatives on measures of quality of water, student
enrollment in elementary school and high school, and coverage of health care for the low-income
population. In particular, there are no clear theoretical predictions for whether more representatives
should improve the quality of public services. Weingast et al. (1981) hypothesize that an increase
in the number of representatives would lead to projects of a larger than optimal scale. This could
worsen the provision of public services for the general population if funds are diverted from non-
distributive programs or services to programs targeting a particular constituency.2 However, if an
increase in the number of representatives strengthens the oversight on the executive (Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2012), additional representatives could increase transparency and efficiency in the use of
public funds.
My findings indicate that although municipalities with two additional representatives have
expected lower total expenditures, they are no different in terms of the quality of public services.
This result contrasts with recent findings by Cepaluni and Mignozzetti (2015), who found that an
increase in the number of representatives in Brazilian municipalities has a positive effect on student
test scores and a negative effect on infant mortality.3
Finally, I provide some evidence of the mechanism driving the results. Because Colombia
uses a proportional representation electoral rule to elect council members, both the number of
decision makers and the party composition of the council change with an increase in the number
of representatives.4 As suggested by Acharya et al. (2016), we can think of changes in the number
of parties with representation or in the diversity of the council as intermediate outcomes that stem
from a change in the number of elected representatives. Thus, the average treatment effect from an
increase in the number of council members could be affected by intermediate variable bias if there are
unobserved factors correlated with the party composition of the council and the outcome variables.
2Here I use the term non-distributive programs to refer to programs or services available to any citizen who might
fall in a specific category, for instance, programs of health care or education for the low income population (Weingast
et al., 1981).
3Cepaluni and Mignozzetti (2015) exploit the introduction of a population rule for the assignment of local repre-
sentatives in Brazilian municipalities to implement a RDD and estimate the effect of number of representatives on
health and education outcomes, and on government audits.
4As indicated by Cepaluni and Mignozzetti (2015), other factors like the diversity of the council or the quality of
elected officials could also change if the increase in the number of representatives leads to greater electoral competition.
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Using a two-step estimation procedure introduced by Acharya et al. (2016), I show that the results
are robust when controlling for the number of parties on the council. This evidence confirms that
factors other than party composition, like the number of decision makers, could be the mechanism
driving the results.
Additionally, this paper also contributes to a larger literature looking at the performance of
decentralization reforms in developing countries. Empirical studies conducted by Faguet (2012) and
Loboguerrero (2008) looking at the effect of decentralization reforms in Bolivia and Colombia find
heterogeneous effects from these reforms on the quality of public services. These authors suggest
that the effectiveness of decentralization might be contingent on the quality of local governments. If
an increase in the number of representatives leads to better oversight of the mayor by the council, we
would expect the performance of decentralization reforms to vary with the number of representatives.
However, I find no evidence that an increase in the number of representatives affects measures of
quality of water, student enrollment, and health care coverage, all of which are administrative
responsibilities assigned to Colombian municipalities as part of a large decentralization program
after 1994. Thus, changes in the number of representatives do not seem to have an effect on the
outcomes of the decentralization reforms implemented over the last twenty years in Colombia.
The paper is organized as follows; the next section provides detailed information about
the organization of local governments in Colombia, the role of municipal councils, and the budget
process. This is followed by a discussion of the data and relevant summary statistics. I then present
a detailed analysis of the validity of the RD design, the estimated equation, and the results. Finally,
I discuss the implications of my findings and avenues for future research.
1.2 Background Information on Colombia
Colombia has two tiers of subnational governments, with the first tier being comprised of
departamentos, which are similar to US states. The second tier is comprised of municipalities, which
are similar to US counties. There are a total of thirty-two departamentos subsequently divided into
1,126 municipalities (see Figure 1.1). Both departamentos and municipalities are administered by
an executive and a deliberative assembly that mimic the roles of the president and legislature at the
national level. At the municipal level, the executive is represented by a mayor and the deliberative
assembly by a municipal council. Both the mayor and the council are elected every four years by
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popular vote.5
This paper exploits the fact that the size of the municipal councils is determined using a
step-function of population to obtain an exogenous source of variation in the degree of represen-
tation in the municipalities. Table 1.1 reports the population thresholds as well as the number of
council members associated with each threshold. I conduct my analysis restricting the sample to
municipalities in the neighborhood of the first four population thresholds (with a population below
sixty-five thousand) because most municipalities are concentrated at the bottom of the population
distribution and because additional policy changes take place at other population thresholds.6 I
further elaborate on the identification strategy in Section 1.4.
The rest of this section discusses the role of Colombian municipalities in the provision of
services and the role of municipal councils in the municipal governments. In comparison to other
developing countries, Colombian municipalities enjoy a high level of political, fiscal, and adminis-
trative decentralization, all of which makes them a good subject for the analysis of the effect of the
number of representatives.
1.2.1 Municipal government in Colombia
The development of municipal governments in Colombia has come as a result of a process
of decentralization over the last thirty years.7 In 1986 popular election of mayors and governors was
introduced, and in the early 1990s the central government began to transfer the provision of services
like education, health and potable water to municipalities and departamentos. The transfer of these
responsibilities came with a system of intergovernmental grants to assist subnational governments
in the provision of these services. Specifically, from 1993 to 2001 intergovernmental grants were
primarily determined using poverty levels and population as criteria, creating minimal accountability
among municipalities since transfers were not linked to performance. The system of grants was
reformed in 2001 so that transfers would be linked to municipal performance in each particular
sector (Clavijo, 2011; Sa´nchez and Pacho´n, 2013).
Under the current system, the role played by municipalities in the provision of services de-
pends on administrative resources and past performance. Provided that municipalities meet certain
5Councils and mayors used to be elected for two-year periods prior to 1994 and for three-year periods between
1994 and 2003.
6As a robustness test I replicate the analysis restricting the sample to municipalities with a population below thirty
thousand. The results are unchanged.
7Political decentralization preceded administrative decentralization (Falleti, 2005).
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criteria, a central government agency extends a certification authorizing the municipality to inde-
pendently provide a given service. Currently, municipalities can obtain certifications in the areas of
education, health, and water and basic sanitation. In uncertified municipalities the departamento
provides the service.
Table 1.2 describes the main differences in the responsibilities between certified and uncerti-
fied municipalities regarding the provision of education, health, and water. It also reports the share
of municipalities, out of those with a population below sixty-five thousand, that are certified as of
2016. The stark difference in the number of municipalities certified in education and health versus
those certified in potable water stems from the way in which certification is granted. Starting in
2007 all municipalities were automatically certified in the provision of potable water, and only non-
compliant municipalities have been de-certified.8 Certification in education and health has moved
in the opposite direction, slowly granting certification as municipalities meet specific criteria.9
Thus, most municipalities in my sample are responsible for the provision of potable water,
garbage collection and sewerage services, the administration of funds for subsidized health care,
public health brigades and investment in projects related to the quality of education. Additionally,
municipalities also provide other services like roads and fire protection (see Table 1.3).
1.2.2 The role of municipal councils
Municipal councils are responsible for overseeing the mayor. In particular, the law does not
grant them any legislative powers, and most of their activities are related to approving the actions
of the mayor. For instance, the mayor needs the approval of the council to establish contracts,
change personnel, and pass the budget. Additionally, the council authorizes increases in the salary
of the mayor and sets the rate for the property and the industry & commerce taxes. These taxes,
along with the gasoline surcharge, represent approximately 90% of the tax revenues collected by
local governments (Sa´nchez et al., 2012).
In addition to these responsibilities municipal councils have other attributes that, if exerted,
would allow them to increase their oversight of the mayor. For instance, the council can ask the
administration to provide periodic reports on the performance of municipal programs and projects.
8The certification for the provision of potable water did not exist prior to 2007. However, municipalities were the
de facto providers.
9The processes for certification for the provision of education and health were formalized in 2001 and 2007, respec-
tively. Before these reforms, departamentos were the de facto providers of these services.
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The electoral process
Council members are elected at-large in single-district elections with a proportional repre-
sentation system and, therefore, do not represent a geographic constituency within the municipality.
This differs from traditional models studying the effect of size of legislatures which assume that
geography is the basis for political organization and representation (Weingast et al., 1981; Primo
and Snyder, 2008). The electoral system of Colombia also allows for council members, but not
mayors, to run for reelection for two consecutive periods. Moreover, council members are elected
from open-party lists, meaning that voters are able to allocate votes to specific candidates within a
given party. These features of the Colombian electoral system increase the accountability of council
members and are conducive for the formation of constituencies.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
The dataset is an unbalanced panel from 1998 to 2014.10 Over this period there were an av-
erage of 1,087 municipalities in Colombia.11 However, when restricting the sample to municipalities
with a population below sixty-five thousand—those around the five, ten, twenty, and fifty thousand
person thresholds as reported in Table 1.1—the sample includes 985 municipalities. Detailed infor-
mation on the sources of the principal variables is reported in Table 1.4 and summary statistics for
these variables are reported in Table 1.5.
As Table 1.5 shows, most municipal revenues come from intergovernmental transfers, and
most expenditures are devoted to investment activities primarily involving the provision of pub-
lic services (e.g., water and basic sanitation, investment in learning centers, subsidized health-
care, maintenance of roads, and public health brigades). Also, approximately fifty-four percent
of municipality-year observations in the sample run an annual deficit. To finance a deficit, munic-
ipalities can borrow from financial institutions in the public sector or use resources available from
past administrations.
The bottom of Table 1.5 reports summary statistics for the variables used to proxy for the
quality of public services in each municipality. These variables include (a) an index of water quality,
10During this period there were five municipal elections during the years 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2011. Prior to
2003, mayors and council members served three-year terms.
11Between 1998 and 2014, thirty new municipalities were created as a result of divisions of existing municipalities.
Thus, the fraction of municipalities experiencing fragmentation is too low to represent a concern.
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(b) the share of low-income population with access to health-care,12 and (c) enrollment in elementary
education and high school. The water quality index ranges from one to one hundred, lower values
indicating higher quality, and is available for the period 2007-2014. Enrollment rates are available
for the period 2005-2012.13
The last variable in Table 1.5 is an indicator for whether the mayor of a municipality faces
disciplinary prosecution by the Procuradur´ıa General de la Nacio´n (PGN), a central government
watchdog agency that oversees the compliance of public officials with a general disciplinary code.
I use this variable as a proxy for the amount of oversight exerted by the council on the mayor
since investigations by the PGN can be triggered by tip-offs and audit results, among other reasons.
Information on mayor prosecution is available for each administration for the period 2001-2015.14
Number of representatives and municipal outcomes
Table 1.6 reports mean values of the outcome variables for councils of different sizes. The
top panel illustrates the problem with computing simple OLS parameter estimates of the effect of the
number of representatives on municipal outcomes. Because the number of representatives increases
with population, mean values for councils of different sizes reflect also differences in the sizes of the
municipalities. Thus, more representatives are associated with higher levels of expenditures, tax
revenues, and debt. In terms of public services, larger municipalities have on average lower levels of
infant mortality, better quality of water, and lower levels of health-care coverage for the low-income
population. Finally, more representatives are associated with a more diverse council, with more
parties obtaining representation and a lower probability that the mayor or council members belong
to the two traditional parties.
1.4 Validity of RD Design and Estimated Equation
1.4.1 Validity of the RD Design
There is increasing research using population thresholds to study the effect of institutional
features (for a recent review of the literature see Eggers et al., 2015). This surge in the use of
12The low-income population is defined by Colombia’s health ministry using Colombia’s proxy-mean-tested system
SISBEN.
13Enrollment is defined as the share of students enrolled out of the target population. The target population
includes children ages 6-10 for elementary school and ages 11-14 for high school.
14The data were collected and kindly provided by Luis Mart´ınez. See Martınez (2016) for a detailed description of
the data and how they were collected.
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population-threshold Regression Discontinuity (RD) designs is due to complications in applying
traditional methods to the study of institutions. Specifically, institutional features are often time-
invariant, making it difficult to apply panel methods or to identify one or more valid instruments
(Acemoglu, 2005). Population thresholds provide, then, an appealing alternative since under specific
circumstances they are a quasi-natural experiment for the variable of interest.
However, as pointed out by Eggers et al. (2015), population-threshold RDDs are susceptible
to confounded treatments because population thresholds are often used to allocate more than one
policy treatment. For instance, Eggers et al. (2015) found that population thresholds used at sub-
national governments in Germany, France, and Italy allocate up to twenty, nine, and five different
policies, respectively. Thus, a traditional RDD would simply estimate the combined effect of the
policies changing at the threshold. Additionally, the existence of multiple treatments exacerbates
the problem of strategic sorting. That is, if the salaries of public officials or the transfers that
local governments receive from the central government change at the population thresholds, public
officials will find it in their best interest to manipulate the population estimates in order to receive
or avoid treatment, provided certain proximity to the threshold.15 These concerns with confounded
treatments and strategic sorting are not a problem in the sample of Colombian municipalities as the
evidence below will explain.
Confounded treatments
Detecting whether a treatment is confounded with another is a matter of searching legal
documents for mentions of population thresholds (Eggers et al., 2015). In particular, council size in
Colombian municipalities could be confounded with transfers from the central government and the
departamentos, limits in the salary of the mayor and honoraria paid to council members, electoral
rules, restrictions in the use of funds, access to credit, and the responsibilities of the municipal
governments. I have thoroughly reviewed the laws regulating the operation of municipal governments
in all of these dimensions and did not find other treatments allocated using the population thresholds
at five, ten, twenty, and fifty thousand people (see Table 1.1).16 I refer the interested reader to
Appendix A for a thorough discussion of the operation of local governments in Colombia.
Sorting
When examining sorting around the population thresholds, it is important to remember that
15As pointed out by Eggers et al. (2015), this could be done by fraud, selective precision, or selective recruitment.
16Since 2001 municipalities with a population of more than one hundred thousand people automatically obtained
certification for the provision of education (Brutti, 2015).
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for the RD design to be valid, municipalities must be unable to precisely manipulate the population
estimates used to allocate council size (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Thus, I begin by examining the
process for generating the population estimates in Colombia.
In Colombia, population estimates are built on the National Census, which is conducted by
a central government agency, the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE),
approximately every ten years. For the period of my sample, the population projections were
constructed using information from the 1985, 1993 and 2005 censuses. In particular, after each
census, the DANE updates and builds population estimates for the next ten or twenty years. These
estimates are updated until the next census and, therefore, are not affected by annual statistics for
births and deaths.17
However, the DANE does not determine the number of council members to be elected as
this is done by another central government agency, the Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil. The
DANE reports the population estimates to the Registraduria, which then issues the number of council
seats to be contested in each municipality according to the population thresholds in Table 1.1. Then,
each electoral year, the Registraduria issues official letters stating the population estimates that it
received from the DANE and the number of council seats corresponding with those figures for each
municipality. Copies of these letters were obtained for the elections of 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007, and
2011, with their population figures serving as the running variable in the RD design.18
The fact that municipal populations are estimated by a centralized agency should reduce
the probability of sorting (Eggers et al., 2015). To formally test for sorting in the data, I follow
Lee and Lemieux (2010) and test for discontinuities in the aggregate distribution of the assignment
variable. The rationale is simple: if municipalities have imprecise control over population figures, we
should not observe discontinuities in the assignment variable around the cutoff. I begin by looking
at histograms of the assignment variable. Figure 1.3 reports frequency histograms for the population
figures obtained from the Registraduria for each of the population thresholds at five, ten, and twenty
thousand people.19 The histograms show the distribution of the distance (in terms of population)
between each municipality and the threshold for municipalities in a ten percent window around each
17This was the case for censuses prior to 2005. The population projections from the 2005 census were built
adjusting for births, deaths and migration. However, because annual data on these variables are limited at the local
level, national estimates of fertility rate and life expectancy were use instead.
18The population estimates used to assign council seats in 2011 were the same as those used in 2007. This was the
result of a disagreement between the Registraduria and the DANE. The running variable is the variable allocating
treatment.
19The results for the fifty thousand people threshold are very similar to those for the twenty thousand people and
therefore are omitted for the sake of brevity. The results are available upon request.
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cutoff. While the histograms for the five and twenty thousand person thresholds show no evidence
of discontinuities, the histogram for the ten thousand person threshold suggests some clustering to
the right of the cutoff.
A formal test for discontinuities in the assignment variable is proposed by McCrary (2008).
The test involves two steps. First, histograms of the distance from each observation to the threshold
are obtained separately for observations to the left and right of the cutoff. Second, a local linear
regression is estimated on each side using the midpoints of each bin as the explanatory variable
and the frequency of each bin as the dependent variable. The parameter of interest is then the log
difference in the predicted densities to the left and right of the cutoff. Eggers et al. (2015) corrects
the McCrary test to account for the fact that the running variable is discrete.20
The results of the McCrary test are reported in the left panels of Table 1.7 and Figure
1.4. Consistent with the histograms, there is no evidence of a discontinuity in the running variable
around the ten thousand person threshold. However, a careful examination of the data reveals that
this discontinuity is not the product of selective sorting by the municipalities but a result of the
process used to generate the population figures. Specifically, the population estimates used during
the 1997, 2000, and 2003 elections were based on projections built from the 1993 census. These
projections were made using the population growth observed during the last two censuses as proxies
for the growth municipalities would experience in the future.
The right hand panels of Table 1.7 and Figure 1.4 report results of the McCrary test using
the population estimates for the year from which the 1993 Census projections were built. As seen in
Figure 1.4, there is a slight discontinuity around the ten thousand person threshold. Subsequent tests
for the population estimates for each year of the population projections reveal that the discontinuity
increases over time. To address the possibility that these changes are driven by the rate of growth
used in building the population projections, I test for differences in the rate of population growth
between municipalities to the right and the left of the threshold.
Figure 1.5 reports sample means of the growth in the population estimates for municipalities
to the left and the right of the ten thousand person threshold. Specifically, panel (a) reports the
growth in the running variable from the estimates used in the 1997 election to those used during
the election in year 2000. Similarly, panels (b) and (c) examine the growth between the 2000 and
2003 elections, and the 2003 and 2007 elections. The plots show that the growth rate did not change
20I am thankful to Andy Eggers for sharing his code.
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discontinuously around the threshold. These results provide evidence that the discontinuity in the
assignment variable around the ten thousand person threshold is not the result of sorting by the
municipalities or manipulation of population estimates by the government agencies. Rather, the
discontinuity is the result of both, the population estimates from the 1993 census and the growth
rate in population between the 1985 and 1993 census.
Specifically, there is no reason to believe that the population estimates of the 1993 census
were subjected to sorting by the municipalities since municipal governments had nothing to gain
from having more than ten thousand people and did not participate in the collection of the data.
On the other hand, while it is possible that differences in the growth rate in population estimates
between the 1985 and 1993 censuses reflect systematic differences between municipalities, there is
no evidence that the population estimates of municipalities to the left and right of the ten thousand
person threshold were growing at different rates.
Inspecting baseline covariates
An additional test of the validity of the RD design inspects for discontinuities of the baseline
covariates at the thresholds by (a) analyzing RD plots for each of the covariates, and (b) replacing
each of the covariates as the dependent variable in the main specification (introduced below) and
computing the parameter estimates of the RD coefficient for each. Figure 1.6 and Table 1.8 report
the RD plots and the RD parameter estimates, respectively.
The RD plots in Figure 1.6 pool observations from a fifteen percent window around the
five, ten, twenty, and fifty thousand person thresholds. It is important to partial out the threshold
fixed effects to make the observations comparable. The graphs report local means for a series of
non-overlapping bins over the support of the running variable. These bins were computed using the
quantile spacing (QS) scheme developed by Calonico et al. (2015). Overall, the local means do not
suggest discontinuities in the local covariates at the threshold. There is some evidence of a jump in
the local mean for the area of the municipalities, but the standard errors are large.
Table 1.8 reports the parameter estimates of the RD coefficient in Equation 1.1 (see below)
on each of the baseline covariates. Overall, there is no evidence of a discontinuity at the threshold on
all but one of the covariates. Specifically, there is a positive and statistically significant estimate of
the RD coefficient on the area of the municipalities. However, this coefficient is not robust to (a) the
inclusion of departamento fixed effects, suggesting that some departamentos with large municipalities
could be driving the result, and (b) reducing the sample to the last three (out of five) administrations
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observed in the sample, supporting the idea that observed differences in area might be driven by
results from the 1993 Census for a few departamentos.
1.4.2 Estimated equation
The main identification strategy is based on a sharp Regression Discontinuity (RD) design
and exploits the fact that council size in Colombian municipalities is solely determined using a step-
function of population (see Table 1.1). Because the analysis exploits multiple thresholds and because
the assignment variable is discrete and reported in coarse intervals, I adopt the following parametric
specification
yit = δrightit +
3∑
d=1
αdDdit +
3∑
d=1
γdfd(popit)Ddit +
3∑
d=1
ρdfd(popit)Dditrightit
+ Xitθ + λdt + uit (1.1)
define yit as the outcome of interest for municipality i in year t. The indicator variables Ddit take
a value of 1 if the threshold d is the nearest threshold to municipality i in year t; rightit is an
indicator variable for whether a municipality lies to the right of its nearest threshold, and fd(popit)
is a polynomial in population distance from municipality i to its nearest threshold—where popit is the
natural log difference between the population of municipality i and the population at the threshold.
In my preferred specification I consider four thresholds d at five, ten, twenty, and fifty thousand
people. To avoid double counting municipalities in a given year, I consider only observations within
a given window around each threshold. For instance, using a twenty-five percent window, the five
thousand person threshold is the nearest threshold to municipalities with a population greater than
3,250 (5000*0.75) but lower than 6,250 (5000*1.25) people.
The parameter δ in Equation 1.1 estimates the local average treatment effect of having two
additional representatives for municipalities to the right relative to those on the left of a population
threshold. Because the parametric functional form uses observations away from the discontinuity,
identification of Equation 1.1 requires additional assumptions about the conditional expected func-
tions E[uit|popit] and E[δi|popit] than those described in Hahn et al. (2001). Specifically, it requires
these conditional expected functions to be continuous and differentiable over their entire domains
14
and not just at the discontinuity (Chen and Van der Klaauw, 2008).
The estimation follows Lee and Lemieux (2010) and evaluates the validity of the afore-
mentioned assumptions by testing (a) whether optimizing agents have imprecise control over the
assignment variable and (b) whether the observed baseline covariates do not change discontinuously
at the thresholds. Section 1.4.1 provided evidence that municipalities do not have control over the
population figures.
Additionally, while municipality fixed effects could be included in Equation 1.1, these are
unnecessary for identification and might increase the variance of the RD estimator if there is little
within-unit variation (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Since the number of municipalities undergoing a
change in council size is small in my sample (except for the elections of 2007), Equation 1.1 treats the
data as a pooled-cross-section. However, because municipalities and departamentos operate together
in the provision of several services, departamento-year fixed effects are included in Equation 1.1
(λdt) to difference out time and departamento specific shocks to the outcome variable. Municipality
characteristics (Xit) are included as controls to reduce the sampling variation in the estimates (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010).
To account for the within-individual correlation of the errors over time, standard errors are
clustered by municipality (Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Bertrand et al., 2004). However, because of the
discrete nature of the running variable, standard errors were also clustered by the running variable
(Lee and Card, 2008) and by municipality and the running variable (Cameron et al., 2012). These
results are available upon request.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Effect of council size on government spending, fiscal effort, and debt
Equation 1.1 is used to estimate the effect of the number of representatives on government
expenditures and to test for their effect on the regulatory activity of municipal councils using one of
the few regulatory powers available to councils, the determination of the property tax rate. Equation
1.1 is also used to test for the effect of the number of representatives on fiscal effort and fiscal
sustainability using total tax revenues to proxy for fiscal effort and total debt and the occurrence of
annual deficits as measures of fiscal sustainability. Parameter estimates are reported in Table 1.9.
The first column of Table 1.9 indicates the dependent variable used in each regression and
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the subsequent columns report parameter estimates when restricting the sample to observations
within a window around the population thresholds. The rationale for narrowing the sample to
observations close to the threshold is to relax the requirements imposed on the function fd(popi)
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). All dependent variables are expressed in natural log with the exception
of the indicator variable for deficits and the property tax rate. All regressions include controls for
geographic and demographic characteristics, the presence of armed conflict, poverty levels prior to
the implementation of intergovernmental transfers, an indicator variable for irregular elections, and
departamento-year fixed effects.21
The main result from Table 1.9 is a negative, statistically significant, and economically
meaningful effect of council size on municipal expenditures. Municipalities located immediately
to the right of the population thresholds have municipal expenditures between five to ten percent
lower than their counterparts immediately to the left of the threshold, the only difference being
that municipalities to the right have two additional representatives than those to the left of the
thresholds. The estimate is robust to restricting the sample to observations on different windows
around the cutoff and seems to be driven by a reduction in municipal revenues. Regarding the
legislative activity of the council, there is no evidence that the number of representatives has an
effect on the effective property tax rate.22 Similarly, no evidence is found of an effect of the number
of representatives on government debt or the probability that the municipality runs a deficit.
What drives the reduction in expenditures?
The negative effect of number of representatives on municipal expenditures is relatively
new to the literature and calls for careful examination. In particular, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and
Garmann (2015) also identify a negative effect of council size on government spending when studying
municipalities in Finland and Germany. They find that the drop in municipal expenditures is driven
by a reduction in the categories of expenditures where the mayor has more discretion, interpreting
the results as evidence that an increase in the number of representatives increases the oversight of
the council on the mayor.23 However, they do not discuss if the reduction in expenditures translates
21Ceballos (2005) documents that during the elections of 2003, armed groups in certain municipalities intimidated
the citizenry and the candidates running as to lower electoral participation. This was a response to the measures
undertaken by president Alvaro Uribe against guerrilla groups.
22Following Iregui et al. (2004) I define the effective property tax rate as the ratio between property tax revenues
and the recorded value of all properties in the municipality. The information on municipal property values comes
from the Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi, which is the entity responsible for updating the property values in
most municipalities in Colombia. I am thankful to Luis Mart´ınez and Fabio Sa´nchez for sharing these data with me.
23There are, however, some discrepancies in the results. The municipalities in Finland examined by Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012) have a manager-council system where the manager is appointed by the council. Garmann (2015), on
the other hand, is able to study the effect of representatives under both a manager-council and mayor-council system
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in lower tax rates or lower debt.
Table 1.10 reports parameter estimates of the RD coefficient on categories of expenditures
and sources of revenues. I first examine the effect of the number of representatives on personnel
expenditures at the city hall since the mayor has some discretion on hiring decisions and the wages
paid to the personnel. Consistent with Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015), there is a
negative effect of council size on personnel expenditures, supporting the hypothesis that a larger
council might exert more oversight on the mayor. However, the effect is too small to alone drive
the reduction in overall expenditures reported in the first row of Table 1.9 (personnel expenditures
amount to seven percent of overall expenses in the average municipality).24
When examining the reduction in expenditures by categories of expenses, mainly operation
vs. capital, most of the reduction is driven by a decrease in investment-related expenditures which
include all expenses related with the provision of municipal services (e.g., education, health, water).
Unfortunately, there is no good data on the break-down of municipal expenditures that would allow
me to pinpoint the categories affected the most.
Moreover, from Table 1.9 it is clear that the reduction in expenses is a result of a decrease
in municipal revenues and not of municipalities running fewer deficits or paying-off debt. The
estimates in Table 1.9 also indicate that the reduction in revenues is not driven by lower fiscal
efforts. Thus, I examine the effect of the number of representatives on the different categories of
intergovernmental grants that municipalities receive from the central government. The last four rows
of Table 1.10 report parameter estimates of the RD coefficient on total central government transfers
for operating and investment expenditures, royalties from the extraction of natural resources, and
total transfers received from the Sistema General de Participaciones (SGP), which is the main source
of intergovernmental grants and includes transfers for the provision of education, health, water and
basic sanitation among other services.
Overall, there is no evidence of a single source of intergovernmental transfers driving the
reduction in revenues. I interpret the lack of a statistically significant effect of the number of rep-
resentatives on fiscal efforts and intergovernmental grants as evidence that the decrease in revenues
is driven by a decrease in the ability of the council to capture funds from the central government.
since municipalities in the German State of Hesse gradually transitioned from one system into the other over the
period in his sample. Contrary to Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), Garmann (2015) only finds an effect of the number of
representatives in municipalities with a mayor-council system.
24The information on personnel expenditures is available only for the period 2002-2010. Also, the parameter
estimates are only significant when using a first order polynomial for fd(popit).
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The fact that no single source drives the reduction of revenues lends credibility to the hypothesis
that the effect is not driven by a confounded treatment.
1.5.2 Effect of council size on the provision of public services and mayor
accountability
As described in Section 1.2.1 and reported in Table 1.2, most municipalities in the sample
are responsible for the provision of water and basic sanitation, and the administration of subsidized
health-care for low-income people. Thus, I use the water quality index and the share of low-income
population with access to health-care in each municipality as my preferred measures of the quality of
public services. Parameter estimates for the effect of the number of representatives on these variables
are reported in the first and second rows of Table 1.11. There is no evidence that an increase in the
number of representatives has an effect on water quality or the share of poor population with access
to health-care.
Additionally, rows three and four of Table 1.11 report parameter estimates of the effect
of the number of representatives on the enrollment in elementary school and high school. Because
municipal governments fund investment projects to improve school infrastructure, it is plausible that
improvements in these services would be reflected in higher enrollment rates. However, there is no
evidence that this is the case.
A final test is conducted for the hypothesis that an increase in the number of representatives
causes an increase in oversight of the mayor by the council. The last row in Table 1.11 reports
parameter estimates for the effect of the number of representatives on the probability that the
mayor faces a disciplinary prosecution by the PGN. The estimate is negative and robust across
window sizes, but is never statistically significant. This result is consistent with a world where the
number of representatives has no effect on mayor oversight and with a long-run equilibrium where
mayors adjust their behavior to higher oversight from an increase in the number of representatives.
1.5.3 The potential reasons why the number of representatives affects
governance
The economics and political science literature presents different hypotheses for why the
number of representatives would have an effect on government performance. One possibility is that
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the number of representatives in the political body itself has an effect on governance. For instance,
an increase in the number of representatives could increase decision-making costs (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962) or facilitate oversight of the mayor (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012). Alternatively, it could
be that a change in the number of representatives affects the number of constituencies that have
political representation (Weingast et al., 1981). If there is a common pool of resources, an increase
in the number of constituencies could increase government expenditures depending on the voting
rule of the political body and the procedures for drafting and approving the budget as well as the
government’s ability to issue debt. Additionally, an increase in the size of political bodies could
affect the diversity and quality of elected officials by increasing political competition (see Cepaluni
and Mignozzetti, 2015).
In Colombia, where representatives are not elected from geographic constituencies but in
single-district elections, the effect of the number of representatives could operate through changes
in the number of parties or political factions that have representation on the council. For instance,
because Colombia uses a proportional-representation electoral system, an increase in the size of the
council is likely to increase the number of small parties that gain representation (Reilly et al., 2005).
I test for this possibility using the following measures of political composition: (a) the number of
parties with at least one seat on the council, (b) a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) calculated
with the share of council seats held by different parties, (c) the share of seats occupied by Colombia’s
two traditional parties, and (d) the share of council seats occupied by the party of the mayor. The
last variable is meant to capture the support enjoyed by the mayor on the council. Thus, an increase
in the number of representatives could increase (decrease) the support for the mayor on the council,
making it easier (harder) for the mayor to implement her desired policies.25
The top panel in Table 1.12 reports parameter estimates of the RD coefficient of Equation
1.1 on the different measures of council composition. I find that, on average, municipalities in the
right hand side of the population thresholds have between 0.2 to 0.4 more parties represented on
the council than municipalities immediately to the left of the population threshold. That is, at least
one of five municipalities would gain an extra party when crossing the threshold.
Because the number of parties on the council is a posttreatment variable realized after the
25A priori it is not clear whether an increase in council size would increase or decrease the support for the mayor.
For instance, if an increase in council size leads to smaller parties gaining representation and these parties establish
a coalition with the party of the mayor, then an increase in the number of parties could strengthen the support for
the mayor on the council (see Cepaluni and Mignozzetti, 2015). Unfortunately, I lack information on the coalitions
of political parties in Colombia. Instead, although imperfect, I use the share of seats occupied by the mayor’s party.
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number of representatives to be elected is determined, the effect on municipal expenditures reported
in Table 1.9 could be driven by either a change in the number of representatives or parties on
the council. As documented by Acharya et al. (2016), this is a common challenge in the empirical
literature where we are interested in whether the causal effect of a treatment remains after controlling
for factors that are realized after the treatment and which could have an effect on the outcome of
interest. In particular, simply adding number of parties as a control in Equation 1.1 could lead
to biased parameter estimates if the posttreatment is endogenous and related to the outcome in
non-causal ways (Acharya et al., 2016). To account for this, the sequential g-esimator introduced
by Acharya et al. (2016) is implemented. The estimator yields the Controlled Direct Effect (CDE)
of the treatment which in my sample corresponds to the causal effect of a change in the number of
representatives when fixing the number of parties on the council to a particular level.
CDE of a change in the number of representatives
The sequential g-estimator is a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the outcome variable
is regressed on the treatment, the mediator or posttreatment variable of interest, pretreatment
controls, and other posttreatment controls. The second stage uses the parameter estimate for the
mediator from the first stage to demediate the outcome and regresses the demediated outcome
on the treatment and pretreatment controls. Thus, the first stage estimates Equation 1.1 with the
number of parties in the council as an additional control. In the second stage, the outcome variable is
demediated using the parameter estimate for the number of parties and is used as the new dependent
variable in Equation 1.1.26
Table 1.13 reports the parameter estimates of the RD coefficient for the second stage re-
gressions of the main outcomes of interest. Overall, conditioning on the number of parties in the
council does not affect the results, suggesting that a mechanism other that changes on the number of
parties in the council is at work. Given that the reduction in revenues is not driven by a particular
source and anecdotal evidence documenting that larger councils seem to elicit more disagreement
among council members and between council members and the mayor, the evidence presented here
suggests that an increase in coordination and decision-making costs could be a mechanism driving
the results.
26I define all geographic variables as pretreatment controls, and measures of population composition and violence
as posttreatment controls.
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1.6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This paper uses a Regression Discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of the number
of elected representatives on different dimensions of governance for a panel of Colombian municipali-
ties over the period 1998-2014. The results indicate that an increase in the number of representatives
(a) causes an average reduction in total expenditures of approximately eight percent for municipal-
ities near the population thresholds; (b) has no effect on municipal measures of quality of water,
access to health care by the low-income population, and student enrollment; and (c) has no effect
on the probability that mayors face disciplinary prosecution by a central government agency.
The lack of evidence of an effect of the number of representatives on the observed measures
of quality of public services suggests that municipalities might cut expenditures in areas of spending
that do not directly affect the quality of these services (e.g., expenditures on administrative person-
nel) or on categories of expenditures unobserved in the sample (e.g., quality of roads, maintenance
of public buildings, execution of social programs). While the data do not allow for distinguishing
between these two possibilities, there is some evidence that municipalities with additional represen-
tatives cut expenditures on personnel in the city hall.
Moreover, decreases in municipal expenditures are driven by reductions in the amount of
intergovernmental transfers received by municipal governments. However, no single source of trans-
fers seems to independently account for the reduction in revenues, suggesting that municipalities are
obtaining fewer transfers but not in a systematic way. This result is consistent with Buchanan and
Tullock’s 1962 hypothesis that an increase in the number of representatives increases the decision-
making and coordination costs of the council.
Thus, for the literature focusing on the effects of legislature size, number of representatives,
or the “law of 1/n”, this paper implies that the effect of additional representation seems to be context-
dependent, as suggested by other empirical studies (e.g., Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012; Garmann, 2015;
Baskaran, 2013). This indication means that a fuller understanding of the interaction between
electoral rules, voting rules in political bodies, and the degree of representation might enhance our
ability to estimate the effect of the number of representatives on governance.
Also, given the recent wave of decentralization reforms among developing countries (Faguet,
2014, 2012; Falleti, 2005; Bardhan, 2002) and concerns about the ability of local governments to
participate in the provision of public services without resources being captured by local elites (Bard-
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han, 2002), the results offer the following insights. First, the division of power between the mayor
and a municipal council seems to be effective to some degree, in the sense that municipal councils
play a role in the number of resources available to municipalities. Second, tax revenues seem to
be unresponsive to changes in the number of representatives, a result that is consistent with pre-
vious findings (Sa´nchez and Pacho´n, 2013) that tax collection efforts are unresponsive to changes
in the local political landscape. This finding is the more interesting for Colombia since municipal
governments have some freedom in setting the rates for the main local taxes. Thus, we need a
better understanding of the institutional factors that are conducive for fiscal efforts at the local
level.27 Third, the number of representatives might affect the ability of local governments to ob-
tain resources from the central government. This outcome could be advantageous if the additional
resources obtained by smaller governments are captured by the local elites.
27Several countries are trying to increase the fiscal independence of local governments to reduce pressure on the
national budget. At the same time, empirical evidence suggests a higher return from public funds collected by local
governments relative to those received as transfers from the central level (e.g., Martınez, 2016).
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Table 1.1: Colombia’s Population Thresholds.
Population Threshold Council Seats Share of Obs. Share of National No. obs in 1% window
Population Left Right
≤ 5000 7 12.84 1.3 60 46
5001 - 10000 9 24.21 5.4 61 92
10001 - 20000 11 29.43 12.4 60 40
20001 - 50000 13 23.28 20.3 43 31
50001 - 100000 15 5.75 11.7 18 24
100001 - 250000 17 2.43 11.1 4 8
250000 - 1000000 19 1.78 21.6 0 0
≥ 1000001 21 0.28 30.8
Total 246 241
Note: Share of national population is computed as the average share of the national population in each category over the
period 1997 - 2015.
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Table 1.2: Role of Municipal Governments in the provision of education, health, and
potable water
Area Certified
(%)
Role if Certified Role if Uncertified
Education 2 (i) Administration of learning centers: hire and
evaluate personnel, allocate personnel and funds
across schools, etc. (ii) Investment in infrastructure
of learning centers.
(i) Investment in infrastructure of learning centers.
Health 35.55 (i) Provision of health services (through regulated
state companies) (ii) Identification of low income
population for subsidized health care (iii)
Management of funds for subsidized health care (iv)
Investment on programs of public health.
(i) Identification of low income population for
subsidized health care (ii) Management of funds for
subsidized health care (iii) Investment on programs
of public health.
Potable
Water &
Sanitation
85.92 Administration of intergovernmental grant for
potable water and basic sanitation
Their departamento administers the
intergovernmental grant for potable water and basic
sanitation.
Note: Sample includes municipalities with a population below sixty-five thousand. The share corresponds to the average for
the period 2014-2016 and was obtained from the National Department of Planning (DNP).
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Table 1.3: Responsibilities in the control and provision of goods and services across
levels of government
Type of Expenditure Policy & Control Provision
National Defense C C
International Relations C C
International Trade C C
Monetary and Financial Policy C C
Social Security C C, D, M
Railroads and Airports C C, M
Natural Resources C C, D, M
Environmental Protection C, D, M C, D, M
Education C, D, M C, D, M
Health C, D, M C, D, M
Social Help C, D, M C, D, M
Police C, D, M C, D, M
Water and Sewer C, D, M C, D, M
Fire protection M M
Parks and Recreation C, D, M C, D, M
National Roads C C
Departamento Roads D D
Inter-Departamento Roads D D
Municipal Roads M M
Note: C - Central Government, D - Departamento Governments, M - Municipal Governments
Source: Taken from Sa´nchez and Zenteno (2011)
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Table 1.4: Data Sources
Variable Source
Public Finances of Municipalities Departamento Nacional de Planeacion (national
department of planning), Contraloria General (office
of the comptroller general), and CEDE database
Geographic information of municipalities CEDE database
Property values Geographic institute Agustin Codazzi
Electoral Data Registraduria Civil de Colombia (Colombia civil
registry office) and CEDE database
Water quality index Superintendency of public services
School enrollment Ministerio de educacion de Colombia (Colombia’s
department of education)
Subsidized health-care coverage for low income
population
Minsiterio de salud de Colombia (Colombia’s health
department)
Migration due to armed conflict Unidad de victimas Colombia (Colombia’s office of
victims)
Mayor prosecutions Martınez (2016)
Note: Data on property values were kindly provided by Luis Martinez (Martınez, 2016) and Fabio Sanchez (Sa´nchez
and Pacho´n, 2013). The database from the Centro de Estudios de Desarrollo Economico (CEDE) is available at
http://datoscede.uniandes.edu.co.
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Table 1.5: Summary statistics for main variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Geographic & Demographic Variables
Share of urban population 15787 39.26 21.43 1.7 98.3
Population (thousands) 15787 16.05 13.29 0.7 101.2
Lost population due to guerrilla (0, 1) 15787 0.60 0.49 0.0 1.0
Area (km2) 985 729.81 2149.71 15.0 41653.0
Dist. to local capital (km) 985 80.59 54.83 0.0 376.1
Public finances
Deficit (0, 1) 15787 0.54 0.50 0.0 1.0
Debt (0, 1) 15787 0.76 0.43 0.0 1.0
Debt (share of revenues) 13235 6.77 10.08 -3.6 269.0
Investment (share of expenses) 13235 81.86 8.78 0.0 100.0
Operating exp. (share non-earmarked rev.) 13228 66.98 27.65 0.0 953.0
Own Revenues (share revenues) 13235 21.57 22.32 0.0 100.0
Transfers (share revenues) 13235 72.65 17.73 3.7 100.0
Fiscal Index 13231 60.05 8.70 11.4 94.2
Total Revenues (millions 2008 COP) 15787 9057.71 9857.21 137.5 323336.8
Total Expenditures (millions 2008 COP) 15787 9413.20 17414.91 2.2 1762977.0
Political Variables
HHI of parties in the council 15787 0.38 0.18 0.1 1.0
No. parties in the council 15787 4.00 1.58 1.0 10.0
Mayor from traditional parties (0, 1) 14626 0.50 0.50 0.0 1.0
Share of seats to traditional parties 15787 49.90 28.47 0.0 100.0
Share of seats to mayor’s party 14626 38.51 24.91 0.0 100.0
No. of representatives 15787 10.55 2.15 7.0 15.0
Quality of public services
Water quality index 7267 26.08 23.07 0.0 100.0
Poor with subsidized health-care 15787 89.90 28.57 0.0 313.0
Enrollment elementary 7695 86.32 13.58 8.3 100.0
Enrollment high school 7695 58.96 18.46 0.0 100.0
Infant Mortality Rate 8651 22.12 8.18 8.7 64.1
Mayor prosecuted (0, 1) 3811 0.15 0.36 0.0 1.0
Note: The sample includes all municipalities with a population below sixty-five thousand for the period 1998-2014. However,
some variables are not available for all years in the sample. Specifically, infant mortality and enrollment rates are available
from 2005 to 2012, the water quality index is available from 2007 to 2014, and information on mayor prosecutions are only
available at the administration level for all administrations after the year 2000.
27
Table 1.6: Average values for main outcome variables by council size
Outcome
No. of Representatives
7 9 11 13 15
Public Finances
Revenues* 3894.60 5428.08 8492.31 14640.07 28962.00
Expenditures* 3998.30 5609.56 8726.50 15386.23 29964.50
Tax Revenues* 302.71 544.40 1169.43 2398.33 8094.78
Debt* 128.90 300.11 498.11 1259.63 3111.80
Deficit (0, 1) 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.54
Transfers (share rev.) 77.56 74.97 72.98 68.39 60.21
Public Services
Water quality index 25.97 28.23 27.62 23.25 13.02
Coverage health-care poor 112.03 96.75 84.83 78.94 75.62
Enrollment elementary 84.43 85.05 85.96 88.75 88.45
Enrollment high-school 62.62 59.08 56.41 58.76 66.67
Mayor prosecuted (0, 1) 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.27
Political Composition
HHI 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.30
No. parties 3.13 3.51 4.08 4.67 5.77
Mayor from trad. party (0, 1) 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.49 0.43
Share seats trad. parties 52.19 53.35 47.77 48.30 46.84
Share seats mayor’s party 43.42 41.29 37.19 35.82 28.72
Note: * indicates variables expressed in millions of 2008 Colombian pesos (COP). The sample includes all municipalities with
a population below thirty thousand for the period 1998-2014. However, some variables are not available for all years in the
sample.
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Table 1.7: Summary of McCrary Test Results
Running variable (1997-2007) Population from 1993 Census
Threshold McCrary Z-score/ N. Obs/ McCrary Z-score/ N. Obs/
Test Statistic P-value Window Test Statistic P-value Window
5,000 0.144 0.344 198 0.321 0.614 185
(0.419) 0.419 500 (0.522) 0.539 2000
10,000 2.753** 2.558 165 0.604 0.716 193
(1.077) 0.011 500 (0.844) 0.474 2000
20,000 -0.358 -0.563 123 -0.056 -0.096 168
(0.636) 0.573 900 (0.582) 0.923 4000
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The left hand panel reports results for a pooled-dataset with the running variable for years 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2007.
The right hand panel reports results of a McCrary test when using the population estimates from the year from which the
1993 Census projections were built.
Window size refers to the number of observations (+/-) included around the cutoff point. In particular, because the running
variable is defined as distance from the threshold, the cutoff is centered at zero. Thus, a window size of 500 means that when
conducting the test I only included municipalities with 500 people above or below the threshold.
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Table 1.8: Parameter estimates of the RD coefficient for regressions of baseline
covariates
Dependent Variable Window Size
25% 20% 15% 10%
ln(dist. local capital) 0.060 0.028 0.018 0.034
(0.063) (0.067) (0.074) (0.081)
2,307 1,835 1,338 891
ln(dist. Bogota) 0.078 0.073 0.067 0.097
(0.066) (0.069) (0.080) (0.092)
2,321 1,843 1,341 893
ln(altitude) -0.189 -0.129 -0.026 -0.026
(0.164) (0.184) (0.206) (0.233)
2,321 1,843 1,341 893
ln(area) 0.224** 0.221* 0.308** 0.333**
(0.101) (0.115) (0.129) (0.151)
2,321 1,843 1,341 893
Poverty Index (1993) -0.085 -1.836 -2.513 -0.841
(1.833) (2.006) (2.239) (2.598)
2,320 1,842 1,340 892
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions use a first order polynomial for the function f(popit); however, the results are robust to the use of
a second order polynomial. Standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses. The number of
observations is reported beneath the standard errors. The data set includes municipalities with a population below sixty-five
thousand people for the period 1998-2014.
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Table 1.9: Parameter estimates of the RD coefficient for regressions of municipal
governments’ public finances
Dependent Variable Window Size
25% 20% 15% 10%
ln(Total expenditures) -0.048* -0.081** -0.083** -0.107**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.037) (0.047)
10,029 7,967 5,835 3,838
ln(Total revenues) -0.041 -0.065* -0.068* -0.098**
(0.029) (0.034) (0.038) (0.047)
10,029 7,967 5,835 3,838
ln(Tax revenues) -0.035 -0.064 -0.103 -0.133
(0.064) (0.070) (0.080) (0.102)
9,501 7,557 5,533 3,636
Property tax rate 0.001 -0.013 -0.028 -0.042
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.026)
7,070 5,640 4,140 2,735
Deficit (0,1) -0.028 -0.044* -0.046 -0.004
(0.022) (0.025) (0.029) (0.038)
10,380 8,270 6,078 3,989
ln(Accumulated debt) 0.123 0.729 0.619 1.249
(0.613) (0.688) (0.772) (1.009)
9,129 7,275 5,375 3,523
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions use a first order polynomial for the function f(popit); however, the results are robust to the use of
a second order polynomial. Standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses. The number of
observations is reported beneath the standard errors. The data set includes municipalities with a population below sixty-five
thousand people for the period 1998-2014.
Controls included: area and altitude of the municipality, distance to Bogota and distance to the capital of the departamento,
indicator variables for whether the municipality lost or gained population due to armed conflict, share of urban population,
share of population living in poverty as of 1993, indicator variable for administrations elected under irregularities, and
departamento-year fixed effects.
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Table 1.10: Parameter estimates of the RD coefficient for regressions of expenditure
categories and sources of revenues
Dependent Variable Window Size
25% 20% 15% 10%
Expenditure Categories
Personnel Expenses -0.050 -0.080* -0.089* -0.103*
City Hall (0.036) (0.041) (0.045) (0.056)
5,470 4,356 3,182 2,101
Capital expenses -0.060** -0.089** -0.081** -0.096*
(0.030) (0.035) (0.038) (0.049)
10,009 7,951 5,821 3,828
Revenue Sources
CG transfers -0.002 -0.012 -0.028 0.009
for operation (0.024) (0.027) (0.036) (0.044)
9,112 7,240 5,285 3,486
Royalties -0.025 0.031 -0.122 -0.182
(0.172) (0.193) (0.230) (0.312)
4,694 3,747 2,751 1,797
CG transfers 0.005 -0.005 -0.013 -0.016
for investment (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025)
9,260 7,349 5,369 3,537
SGP program -0.007 -0.018 -0.023 -0.009
transfers (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022)
7,314 5,816 4,267 2,808
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All dependent variables are expressed in natural log. All regressions use a first order polynomial for the function
fd(popit). Standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses. The number of observations is
reported beneath the standard errors. The data set includes municipalities with a population below sixty-five thousand
people for the period 1998-2014.
Controls included: area and altitude of the municipality, distance to Bogota and distance to the capital of the departamento,
indicator variables for whether the municipality lost or gained population due to armed conflict, share of urban population,
share of population living in poverty as of 1993, indicator variable for administrations elected under irregularities, and
departamento-year fixed effects.
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Table 1.11: Parameter estimates of the RD coefficient for regressions of quality of
services and mayor prosecutions
Dependent Variable Window Size
25% 20% 15% 10%
Water quality index -0.011 -0.125 -0.151 0.010
(0.099) (0.114) (0.144) (0.186)
4,602 3,686 2,736 1,765
Coverage health care 0.009 -0.002 0.007 0.019
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.028)
10,389 8,276 6,083 3,993
Enrollment elmn. edu. 0.043** 0.037 0.034 0.057
(0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.037)
4,899 3,900 2,866 1,870
Enrollment H.S. edu 0.018 0.014 -0.011 0.050
(0.030) (0.033) (0.042) (0.060)
4,899 3,900 2,866 1,870
Mayor prosecuted (0, 1) -0.042 -0.083* -0.061 -0.084
(0.033) (0.042) (0.050) (0.071)
2,273 1,682 1,158 687
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All dependent variables with the exception of mayor prosecutions are expressed in natural logs. Dependent variables include
water quality index measured in a scale from 1 to 100 (higher values reflect lower quality), low income population with access
to health-care, enrollment in public elementary schools and high-schools, and an indicator for whether the mayor received a
disciplinary prosecution by a central government watchdog agency (Procuraduria General).
Controls included: area and altitude of the municipality, distance to Bogota and distance to capital of the departamento,
indicator variables for whether the municipality lost or gained population due to armed conflict, share of urban population,
share of population living in poverty as of 1993, and departamento-year fixed effects. All regressions use a first order
polynomial for fd(popit), a second order polynomial yielded similar results. Parameter estimates for the RD coefficient on
the probability of preosecuting the mayor correspond to the average marginal effects from a logit model.
Standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses. Number of observations is reported beneath
standard errors. Panel includes municipalities with a population below sixty-five thousand people.
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Table 1.12: Parameter estimates of the RD coefficient for regressions of measures
of council composition
Dependent Window Size
Variable 25% 20% 15% 10%
No. Parties 0.256** 0.240* 0.317** 0.426**
(0.116) (0.132) (0.156) (0.204)
8,655 6,884 5,072 3,327
HH index -0.006 -0.001 -0.009 -0.016
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.022)
8,655 6,884 5,072 3,327
Share seats 1.535 4.459** 5.433** 3.004
trad. parties (1.941) (2.190) (2.716) (3.440)
8,655 6,884 5,072 3,327
Share seats 2.343 1.583 0.764 -3.147
mayor’s party (2.001) (2.332) (2.827) (3.722)
7,977 6,379 4,719 3,096
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controls included: area and altitude of the municipality, distance to Bogota and distance to capital of the departamento,
indicator variables for whether the municipality lost or gained population due to armed conflict, share of urban population,
share of population living in poverty as of 1993, and departamento-year fixed effects. All regressions use a quadratic functional
form for k(popit), higher order polynomial yielded similar results.
Standard errors are clustered by municipality and reported in parentheses. Number of observations is reported beneath
standard errors. Panel includes municipalities with a population below sixty-five thousand people.
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Table 1.13: Parameter estimates of the Control Direct Effect of an increase in the
number of representatives on main outcome variables
Dependent Variable Window Size
25% 20% 15% 10%
ln(Total expenditures) -0.048* -0.079** -0.079** -0.114**
(0.028) (0.034) (0.037) (0.048)
ln(Total revenues) -0.043 -0.065* -0.068* -0.107**
(0.028) (0.034) (0.038) (0.048)
Water quality index -0.011 -0.133 -0.187 -0.021
(0.104) (0.115) (0.147) (0.193)
Coverage health care 0.013 0.018 0.029 0.047
(0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.030)
Enrollment elmn. edu. 0.048** 0.048* 0.045 0.072*
(0.021) (0.024) (0.030) (0.041)
Enrollment H.S. edu 0.029 0.041 0.027 0.065
(0.034) (0.038) (0.044) (0.065)
Mayor prosecuted (0, 1) -0.035 -0.061* -0.047 -0.065
(0.031) (0.034) (0.045) (0.057)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Parameter estimates from a second stage regression of demediated dependent variables on an indicator variable for munic-
ipalities at the right of the population threshold, a first order polynomial for fd(popit), indicator variables for the nearest
threshold, and pretreatment controls. Standard errors reported in parentheses were bootstrapped and account for the panel
nature of the data.
35
Figure 1.1: Colombia’s Municipalities
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Figure 1.2: Reported Council Seats
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Note: Municipality-year observations for the elections conducted in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2011. I compared the
number of council seats to be contested in each municipality, as issued by the central government before the elections,
with the number of council members elected in each municipality. The observations with the x markers correspond
to municipality-year observations that lack information on electoral results or that have a number of elected members
that differs from the number of seats that were to be contested.
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Figure 1.3: Population Thresholds, Colombia
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Note: Frequency histograms of the running variable for the five, ten, and twenty thousand people thresholds using
observations in a twenty percent window around the cutoff value. The running variable is expressed as the population
distance from each municipality to its nearest threshold.
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Figure 1.4: McCrary Tests of the Running Variable
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Note: The left hand panel reports results for a pooled-dataset with the running variable for years 1997, 2000, 2003,
and 2007. The right hand panel reports results of a McCrary test when using the population estimates from the year
from which the 1993 Census projections were built.
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Figure 1.5: Local average plots for population growth around the ten thousand
people threshold for different electoral periods
(a) From 1997 to 2000
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(b) From 2000 to 2003
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(c) From 2003 to 2007
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Note: Panels (a), (b), and (c) examine the growth in population estimates used to allocate council seats between the
elections held in 1997 and 2000, 2000 and 2003, and 2003 and 2007; for municipalities in a 25% around the ten thousand
people threshold. The graphs report sample means of population growth constructed over non-overlapping regions of the
population distance between municipalities and the cutoff. The bins are chosen using Calonico et al. (2014a)
mimicking-variance quantile-spaced method to better reflect the underlying variability in the data.
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Figure 1.6: Balance Checks on Baseline covariates
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Note: Plots report average values for each covariate within non-overlapping bins to the left and the right of a
population threshold. Threshold fixed effects have been partialled out to pool together the observations around the
thresholds at five, ten, twenty, and fifty thousand people. The running variable is expressed as the difference in the
natural log of a municipality’s population and the natural log of the population at the threshold. Bins are computed
using the quantile spaced (QS) partitioning scheme introduced by (Calonico et al., 2015).
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Figure 1.7: Number of municipalities that lose & gain seats
(a) Five thousand people threshold
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(b) Ten thousand people threshold
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(c) Twenty thousand people threshold
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(d) All thresholds
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Note: Panel (d) refers to the combined changes across the five, ten, and twenty thousand people thresholds.
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Chapter 2
Do local representatives constrain
the executive? Revisiting the
evidence from European
municipalities
Thirteen men...will not produce the vigilance of one man multiplied by thirteen; but rather the vigi-
lance of one man divided by thirteen.
2.1 Introduction
Recent studies by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015) found evidence challeng-
ing the notion that political bodies with a larger number of representatives choose higher levels of
public spending, a proposition known as the law of 1/n in the public finance literature (Weingast
et al., 1981). Moreover, both studies suggest that a reduction in municipal expenditures is driven
by greater oversight of the executive by the council. That is, an increase in the number of elected
representatives leads to higher accountability of appointed managers in Finland and elected man-
agers in Germany. The fact that the same result is found in two different institutional systems is
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of particular interest. In Finland, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) looks at municipalities with council-
manager systems, in which the council appoints a manager to administrate the municipality and has
the authority to remove her from office. In Germany, Garmann (2015) looks at municipalities with
a council-mayor system where both the mayor and the council are elected by the popular vote and
the council does not have the authority to remove the mayor from office.
In the case of Finland, the fact that an increase in council members leads to lower ex-
penditures is unexpected because a council-manager system shares many institutional similarities
with the model proposed by Weingast et al. (1981), which is often seen as predicting a positive
association between the number of decision makers and total spending (Primo and Snyder, 2008).
For instance, Finnish municipalities enjoy substantial fiscal powers and administrative responsibili-
ties, most of them vested in the council. In addition, council members are elected in single-district
elections through open-party lists, meaning that candidates might be held accountable by their
constituency.1
Conversely, the fact that an increase in the number of representatives improves the account-
ability of the mayor in German municipalities suggests that the number of representatives, or the
composition of the council, can be used to strengthen the division of power between executive and
legislative bodies in some settings. This division would, of course, depend on the rules used to elect
representatives, the party system, and the voting rules in the council. In summary, both results
open new lines of research into the mechanisms at play in the administration of local governments.
A common feature of both studies is that they present their estimates of the effect of council
size as coming from a Regression Discontinuity (RD) specification, making the results appealing
because RD designs provide a closer approximation to a randomized design than other evaluation
strategies such as IV’s (Lee and Lemieux (2010)). In particular, because of the characteristics of
their data (e.g., limited number of observations, a discrete running variable, and multiple population
thresholds), both researchers suggest the use of a parametric model that exploits the discontinuities
in the data while accounting for its limitations. However, after examining the estimated equations by
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015), I show that they do not yield the same parameter
estimates as those obtained from standard RD specifications. Moreover, their estimated equations
are inappropriate because they do not account for the data generating process of the treatment being
1Nonetheless, Primo and Snyder (2008) have shown that Weingast et al.’s (1981) model is also consistent with a
negative relation between the number of decision makers and total spending.
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examined and lead to the use of artificial variation in the estimation of the parameter estimates.
Because they do not employ standard RD designs, the data from Pettersson-Lidbom (2012)
and Garmann (2015) are used to estimate the effect of changes in the number of representatives using
an appropriate RD specification. Estimates from Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015)
are different from those obtained from the RD design. For the sample of Finnish municipalities,
the RD estimates are sometimes similar in magnitude to those found by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012).
However, the RD estimates are not statistically significant and are less robust to changes in the
degree of the polynomial of the running variable. For the sample of German municipalities, the
RD estimates are different in magnitude to those obtained by Garmann (2015). In particular, the
magnitude of the estimates for the sub-sample of elected managers is largely susceptible to the degree
of the functional form chosen for the assignment variable.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides basic background information
about the operation of municipal governments in Finland and Hesse, and summarizes the empirical
results from Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015). Because that discussion is necessarily
brief, interested readers are referred to the original papers. Section Three examines the models
estimated by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015), showing that their specifications are
not consistent with an RD design. Section Four reviews the traditional RD design and how it has
been extended in the literature to take into account situations where (i) the assignment of treatment
occurs at multiple values of the running variable and (ii) the running variable has non-continuous
support. Section Five implements RD designs for both samples, comparing the results with those
obtained by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015). Section Six concludes.
2.2 Municipal Governments in Finland and Germany
2.2.1 Operation of municipal governments in Finland
Pettersson-Lidbom’s 2012 sample includes 391 Finnish municipal governments over the pe-
riod 1977 to 2002.2 These governments provide such services as education, day care, and care for
the elderly. Municipalities also enjoy substantial fiscal independence as they can set their own pro-
portional income tax rate, have no limits on borrowing, and receive only a fifth of their revenues
2Although Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) uses information from both Finnish and Swedish municipalities, I restrict my
analysis to his results from Finland because these are the more robust.
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from intergovernmental transfers (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012). Finnish municipal governments oper-
ate under a council-manager system. The council is a body of representatives elected every four
years by popular vote in at-large elections. Its size is determined using a discontinuous function of
population; the population thresholds are reported in Table 2.1. The manager, who is appointed by
the council, is responsible for the administration and financial management of the municipality.
2.2.2 Effect of Council Size in Finland
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) identifies the effect of council size using the following equation:
ln(yit) = α+ βln(Cit) + f(popit) + λt + γi + εit (2.1)
where the outcome variable yit is expressed in per-capita terms, Cit is the number of council members,
f(popit) is a polynomial of the running variable, and λt and γi are year and municipality fixed
effects, respectively. Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) describes Equation 2.1 as a fixed-effect approach
combined with a RDD set up. Table 2.3 reports the main results from Pettersson-Lidbom (2012),
with Column (2) listing the parameter estimate for β from a regression without f(popit) and without
municipality fixed effects, while Column (3) reports the parameter estimates obtained after including
municipality fixed effects. Columns (4), (5), and (6) correspond to parameter estimates of β obtained
from Equation 2.1 when including a first, second, and third order polynomial for the population in
the municipality. Rows two to five in Table 2.3 report the parameter estimates of β obtained from
Equation 2.1 when restricting the sample to municipality-year observations within a window around
the thresholds.3
The results from Table 2.3 suggest a negative, statistically significant, and economically
relevant effect of council size on municipality per capita expenditures. Specifically, a one percent
increase in council size is associated with a 0.07 percent decrease in expected per capita expenditures.
Because the changes in council size in the sample are between 20 to 30 percent, the average effect
from crossing a threshold is a decrease in per capita expenditures between 1.4 and 2.1 percent.
2.2.3 Operation of Municipal Governments in Hesse, Germany
Garmann (2015) uses a sample of 426 municipalities in the German State of Hesse over the
3Angrist and Pischke (2008) suggest that narrowing the sample to observations close to the threshold reduces the
possibility of a specification error.
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period 1985-2000. Similar to Finnish municipalities, these local governments also enjoy substantial
fiscal and administrative independence. For instance, they administer elementary schools and are
responsible for the maintenance of roads and economic promotion. These governments also have the
autonomy to set three tax rates: a property tax, a tax on business profits, and a tax on agricultural
land.
Additionally, the data from Hesse have the advantage of observing municipalities over two
regimes. Prior to 1993 all municipalities operated under a council-manager regime where the council
was elected in at-large elections every four years by popular vote and the manager was subsequently
appointed by the council. Under this regime, the manager had no voting or veto powers over the
council’s decisions and could be removed from office by the council. Thus, the role of the manager
was to implement the decisions made by the council, with some discretion for daily administrative
tasks and hiring or dismissing of public employees. However, from 1993-1999 municipalities gradually
transitioned from a council-manager to a council-mayor system of governance, the main difference
being that the manager is now elected by popular vote and cannot be dismissed by the council.
In addition, the size of the council has always been determined using a discontinuous function of
population. Table 2.2 reports the population cutoffs and the associated council sizes; in particular,
Garmann (2015) restricts his analysis to those municipalities with a population below twenty-five
thousand.
2.2.4 Effect of Council Size in Hesse, Germany
To estimate the differential effect of council size between municipalities with an appointed
and an elected manager, Garmann (2015) uses the following equation:
yit = α+ βCit + γCitDit + δ
′Xit + ρDit + f(popit) + f(popit)Dit + λt + εit (2.2)
where yit denotes the outcome variable of interest, Cit refers to the size of the council, f(popit) is
a polynomial of the running variable or treatment-determining covariate, Xit is a vector of control
variables, λt are year fixed effects, and Dit is an indicator variable equal to one if the manager is
elected in the municipality and zero otherwise. In particular, the parameter estimates for β and
β+γ are interpreted as the effects of council size in municipalities with an appointed and an elected
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manager, respectively.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 replicate the results from Garmann (2015) for the effect of council size on
municipal total expenditures and material spending, respectively. Upper panels in the tables report
parameter estimates for the effect of council size in municipalities where the manager is appointed
(β) while the lower panels report similar estimates for municipalities where the manager is elected
(β+γ). The columns report estimates for Equation 2.2 when omitting the running variable (referred
to as OLS estimates) and when using a third, fourth, and fifth order polynomial for f(popit) (referred
to as RDD estimates). Similarly, the first column indicates for each row whether the estimates were
obtained using all municipalities with a population below twenty-five thousand or only those with a
population within a twenty-five, twenty, and ten percent window around the thresholds.
The estimates from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 indicate that the effect of council size on municipal
expenditures is more salient during the period when the managers are elected than when they are
appointed, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. Garmann (2015) interprets this
result as evidence that the effect of council size is a response to agency problems between the council
and the manager, with the agency problems being exacerbated once the manager is elected and not
appointed by the council. Further support for this argument is drawn from the fact that the reduction
in municipal expenditures is driven by reductions in material and personnel spending, both of which
are categories of expenditures where the administration enjoys more discretion.4 Specifically, when
the manager is elected an additional council member is associated with a 0.9 and 1.4 percent decrease
in total and material spending, respectively. Since the municipalities in the sample gain between
six to eight council members when crossing the thresholds, the results suggest that municipalities
undergoing a change in council size on average experience a drop in total and material spending of
at least 5.4 and 8.4 percent, respectively.
2.3 Discussion of the Results from Finland and Hesse
2.3.1 Examining the Results from Finland
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) describes Equation 2.1 as a fixed-effect approach combined with
a RDD set up. In particular, he refers to its results, when omitting population as a covariate, as the
4Garmann (2015) also estimates the effect of council size on capital spending and multipliers for the local tax rates
determined by the council, finding no evidence of a council size effect on these outcomes.
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results from a pure fixed effect (FE) regression (see Column 2 in Table 2.3) and to the results when
including population covariates as coming from an RD specification (Columns 4-6 in Table 2.3).
However, in this section I show that Pettersson-Lidbom’s (2012) results in Table 2.3 are estimated
from an unobserved effects panel data model and should not be interpreted as coming from an RD
specification.
I begin by reviewing the assumptions under which FE estimation is desirable.5 If the true
population regression function is given by
E[ln(yit)|Cit, popit,Xit, ai] = α+ βln(Cit) + γpopit + δ′Xit + ai (2.3)
where ai is a time-invariant unobserved random variable that its believed to be correlated with
the other covariates, then FE estimation provides a way to consistently estimate the parameters
β, γ, and δ from Equation 2.3. This is typically done using the within transformation: averaging
the regression equation over all time periods and subtracting it from the original equation. The
transformed regression equation corresponds to
(ln(yit)− ln(yi)) =β(ln(Cit)− ln(Ci)) + γ(popit − popi)
+ δ′(Xit −Xi) + (λt − λ) + (εit − εi) (2.4)
where ln(yi), ln(Ci)), popi, and Xi are population averages for each of the variables in the model
taken over all periods T . Equation 2.4 cannot be interpreted as an RD specification because the
central idea behind an RD design is to exploit available information about the process determining
treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), which in the case of Finland is the fact that council size
is a discontinuous function of population. While Equation 2.4 rightfully controls for the size of
population, since changes in council size are determined by the change in population experienced
by a municipality, it does not account for the fact that the researcher knows precisely how these
changes are determined.
Adding higher order terms for (popit − popi) to Equation 2.4 is not consistent with an RD
design. In parametric applications of an RD design, higher order terms for the running or assignment
variable are included to guarantee that the conditional expected function E[ln(yit)|popit] is not
misspecified since identification relies on comparing this conditional expectation for values of popit
5I closely follow the discussion of panel data models by Wooldridge (2010).
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immediately to the left and to the right of the threshold (see Lee and Card, 2008; Angrist and Pischke,
2008). In Equation 2.4, higher order terms for (popit−popi) are meant as controls so that there are no
unobserved time-varying factors correlated with the treatment of interest ln(Cit). However, including
these terms is inefficient given the knowledge that (i) changes in Cit are completely determined by
changes in population and (ii) the function relating changes in council size to changes in population
for a given municipality is not a polynomial.6 In particular, the use of Equation 2.4 might explain
why the results from Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) in Table 2.3 are largely invariant to the use of higher
order polynomials for population.
Having established that the parameter estimates from Equation 2.1 are not consistent with
an RD design, it is worth pointing out that the choice of using FE estimation to identify the effect of
council size might be defended on certain grounds. As suggested by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), the
fact that there are few observations in the neighborhood of the population thresholds prevents the
implementation of an RD design using non-parametric methods. As discussed in Section 3.4, this
leaves the researcher with the choice of implementing a parametric RDD which uses extrapolation
from observations away from the discontinuity (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Under these circumstances,
estimation of the effect of council size using standard regression methods might seem appealing.
However, these methods are necessarily less efficient because they do not make use of the information
about the data generating process for the treatment of interest. More importantly, the average
treatment effect estimated from Equation 2.1 is not the same as the one obtained from RD designs
which represent the ATE for the subpopulation in the neighborhood of the discontinuity.7
2.3.2 Examining the Results from Hesse, Germany
Garmann (2015) refers to Equation 2.2 as a combination of a regression discontinuity design
with a difference-in-differences approach. However, he acknowledges that his model is different from
current difference-in-discontinuities designs used to address the presence of confounded treatments
in traditional RD designs (Grembi et al., 2012).
In particular, because all variables in Equation 2.2 are interacted with the indicator variable
6This would be a discontinuous function where changes in council size occur only if the absolute value of the change
in population experienced by a municipality is greater than the absolute value of the population distance between the
municipality and its nearest threshold.
7Moreover, as indicated by Lee and Lemieux (2010), the ATE from RD designs can be interpreted more generally
as a weighted ATE where the weights correspond to the ex-ante probabilities that the value of the assignment variable
for an individual will be in the neighborhood of the threshold.
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Dit, the model is equivalent to estimating a separate equation of the following form for each regime
8
yit = α+ βCit + δ
′Xit + f(popit) + λt + εit (2.5)
where all variables are defined as in Section 2.2.4. Thus, although Garmann (2015) refers to the
parameter β in Equation 2.5 as the RD effect of council size on municipal expenditures, careful
inspection makes clear that the parameter β is different from the parameter τ in Equation 2.7.
Specifically, the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) theorem shows that the linear regression model in
Equation 2.5 can be re-specified as
µˆit = δ + θuˆit + it (2.6)
where µˆit and uˆit are OLS residuals from regressions of yit and Cit on the other covariates, and
where the OLS parameter estimate for θ is the same as the one for β from Equation 2.5.9
Equation 2.6 indicates that the variation used to estimate the effect of council size is artificial;
that is, it comes from using the wrong functional form for population. To exemplify this, imagine
that the only covariate used in Equation 2.5 is a polynomial for population, Equation 2.6 would
then be estimated using the residuals from regressing municipal expenditures and council size on
this polynomial. In particular, since the actual relationship between council size and population
is known to be a step function, the residuals uˆit represent an artificial variation—the result of
mis-specifying the relationship between council size and population.
Figure 2.1 shows plots for the observed values of council size as a function of population
along with values for uˆit from regressions using a first and third degree polynomial of population.
It is evident that both functions provide a poor fit for the true relationship between council size
and population, which we know is a step function. This analysis explains why the results from
Garmann (2015) reported in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 are largely insensitive to the use of higher order
polynomials. Notice that the vertical distance between the predicted and observed values for council
size in Figure 2.5 would be used in Equation 2.6 to estimate the effect of council size on expenditures.
However, since this variation is generated from fitting the wrong functional form for the relation
between council size and population, it is unclear how the parameter θ should be interpreted. For
8Although the sociodemographic variables in Equation 2.2 are not interacted with the indicator variable Dit,
Garmann’s 2015 results are unaffected by the exclusion of those interactions
9See page 62 in Davidson and MacKinnon (2004).
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this reason, Lee and Lemieux (2010) argue that an RDD should be seen as a data generating process,
not as a method, since it is the knowledge about this process that determines the estimation method
to be used.
2.4 Conducting a RD Design When Treatment Is Assigned
at Multiple Thresholds and the Running Variable Has
Limited Support
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report the population thresholds used in Finland and Hesse to allocate
the number of representatives. In both cases, the data generating process is consistent with a sharp
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design, with the number of representatives changing discontinuously
at each of the population thresholds. However, contrary to traditional RD designs, in both data
sets treatment is assigned at multiple thresholds and the assignment or running variable is discrete
and reported in coarse intervals. To show how these features of the data affect the estimation of the
Average Treatment Effect (ATE), a review of the traditional RD design is useful as well as how it
has been extended in the literature to address with these limitations.10
RDD in a Simple Cross-section
Define yi as the outcome of interest for subject i. Assume subjects are exposed to treatment
whenever a continuous variable x crosses some threshold c, such that Di = D(xi) = 1[xi ≥ c], where
Di is an indicator variable equal to one if subject i is treated. We can then estimate the treatment
effect using the following model
yi = α+ τDi + βl(xi − c) + βr(xi − c)D + εi (2.7)
where the running variable xi is centered at the threshold such that τ is the difference between the
intercepts of two linear regressions, one to the left and one to the right of the threshold. Equation 2.7
implicitly assumes that the relation between the running variable xi and the outcome of interest is
linear, which can result in biased estimates of the treatment effect because the goal is to estimate the
parameters at the threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Hahn et al. (2001) show that the assumption
of a linear model is unnecessary and that the treatment effect can be estimated non-parametrically
10My discussion follows closely Lee and Lemieux (2010) and Hahn et al. (2001).
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under the assumptions that E[yi(1)|x] and E[yi(0)|x] are continuous at c, where yi(1) and yi(0)
represent the potential outcomes for subject i with and without treatment, respectively.
While recent applications of RD designs estimate the treatment effect using local linear
regression as suggested by Hahn et al. (2001), the characteristics of the data used by Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015) prevent the use of nonparametric methods because their running
variables are discrete and reported at coarse intervals, meaning that there are few municipalities in
the neighborhood of the population cutoffs. As Lee and Card (2008) show, when the running variable
presents these characteristics the treatment effect is not non-parametrically identified, proposing a
procedure for statistical inference under a parametric model. In the simplest case, they propose
estimating the following model
yi = α+ τDi + f(x˜i) +Df(x˜i) + εi (2.8)
where x˜i = xi − c so that the threshold is set at 0 and f(·) is a polynomial of the running variable
(i.e. f(·) = x˜ + x˜2 + x˜3). To address the concern that the parametric functional form might be
mis-specified, Lee and Card (2008) suggest modeling the deviations of the true conditional means
from the parametric function as random specification errors with unknown variance. Specifically,
they show that under the assumption that the specification errors to the left and the right of the
threshold are the same, OLS estimators with standard errors clustered at the individual values of
the running variable will be consistent.
The Panel Nature of the Data
Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest a simple extension to Equation 2.8 to take into account the
fact that the same units are observed over time; that is, they propose estimating
yit = α+ τDit + f(x˜it) +Df(x˜it) + λt + γi + εit (2.9)
where t indicates the time period. Equation 2.9 can be estimated as a pooled cross-section (omitting
the municipality fixed effects γi) or as a panel (with municipality fixed effects γi). While including
municipality fixed effects would control for time-invariant omitted variables, this is not a concern
for identification in an RD design because treatment in the neighborhood of the threshold should
be uncorrelated with municipality-specific characteristics. Moreover, if there is little within-unit
variation in treatment, the use of municipality fixed effects can increase the variance of the RD
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estimator (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
Multiple Thresholds
Equation 2.9 estimates the ATE from a single treatment. I now discuss the different ap-
proaches used in the literature to account for circumstances when a treatment is assigned at different
levels in the support of the running variable. Ideally, the simplest way to account for this is to es-
timate a separate treatment effect for each threshold since there is no reason to believe that the
treatment effect across thresholds is the same. However, because of data limitations, researchers in
many instances pool observations from different thresholds (Eggers et al., 2015) or estimate a poly-
nomial of the running variable on each side of the thresholds but restrict the effect of the treatment
to be the same (Dell et al., 2015). With the first approach, we partial out threshold fixed effects
and compute parameter estimates for a model similar to Equation 2.9. Under the second approach,
we estimate the following model:
yit = τDit +
C∑
c=1
αcHcit +
C∑
c=1
γcfc(x˜it)Hcit +
C∑
c=1
ρcfc(x˜it)HcitDit + λt + uit (2.10)
where Hcit is an indicator variable equal to one if threshold c is the nearest threshold to municipality
i in year t, and fc(x˜it) is a polynomial of the population difference between municipality i and its
nearest threshold c.
Alternatively, Tukiainen and Lyytika¨inen (2013) suggest estimating a parametric model that
allows for the treatment effect to be different at each threshold. Their equation is given by
yit = β1 + β2Group2it + ...+ βnGroupNit + f(xit)
+Group2itf(xit − c1) + ...+GroupNitf(xit − cn−1) + λt + uit (2.11)
where Group2 and GroupN are indicator variables for observations crossing the first and last thresh-
olds. For instance, given the population thresholds for Finnish municipalities reported in Table 2.1,
Group2 would be equal to one for municipalities with a population greater than two thousand. No-
tice that the indicator variables overlap with one another so that the parameters β can be interpreted
as the ATE from an increase in the treatment variable. Similarly, to allow for a different functional
54
form of the running variable at different levels of treatment, the group dummies are interacted with
the polynomial for population f(·), with population being normalized at zero for that threshold. For
instance, the Group2 dummy is interacted with f(xit − 2001) since the cutoff between the first and
second groups is a population of 2001.
The next section implements RD designs for the samples from Finland and Hesse using
Equations 2.8, 2.10, and 2.11. A limitation of the existing literature is that there are no clear criteria
for choosing among these models; because of this, I use the results from the different regressions in
combination with RD plots to make inferences about the effects of changes in council size at the
population discontinuities.
2.5 Estimating the Effect of Council Size in Finnish and Ger-
man Municipalities Using an RDD
2.5.1 Graphical Evidence: RD plots
RD plots, a standard tool in RD designs, are usually presented as preliminary evidence of
the effect being studied. Moreover, because the construction of RD plots involves choices regarding
the number of bins, the partitioning scheme for constructing them, and a polynomial regression
to smooth the graph, the researcher has some discretion in how to build a graph to accentuate or
attenuate a discontinuity. Thus, to guard against biases in the construction of the RD plots, I use the
STATA command introduced by Calonico et al. (2014b) for standardizing the graphical evidence
presented here. In particular, I chose their quantile-spaced partitioning scheme (Calonico et al.,
2015) which takes into account the sparsity of the data and defines bins containing approximately
the same number of observations.
Figure 2.2 reports RD plots for the first five population thresholds in Finland. This sample
includes municipalities with a population below forty-five thousand to guarantee some observations
in the neighborhood of the thresholds. This figure shows that for the thresholds at 2001, 8001,
and 15001, some evidence of a discontinuity exists, and for the threshold at 4001, there seems
to be a discontinuity in municipal expenditures but in the opposite direction of the effect found by
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012). There is also evidence of a discontinuity at the threshold of 30001 people,
but there is too much variation in the right side of the threshold to argue that this discontinuity is
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due to the change in council size.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 report RD plots for German municipality-year observations where the
manager was appointed and elected, respectively. I follow Garmann (2015) and restrict the sample to
municipalities with a population below twenty-five thousand due to the low number of observations
at higher population thresholds (see Table 2.2). These two are somewhat consistent with the results
from Garmann (2015) in that there is some evidence of discontinuities but only in the sample
for elected managers. Specifically, we observe discontinuities at the thresholds of 3001 and 10001
people. However, only the evidence from the 10001 threshold seems reliable since there are several
discontinuities at the left of the 3001 threshold that suggest the observed discontinuity at this
threshold is not being caused by a change in council size.
2.5.2 RD Parameter Estimates
This section computes RD parameter estimates for the effect of council size using the equa-
tions described in Section 3.4. First, observations from the different thresholds are pooled to estimate
Equation 2.9. To do this, the running variable is defined as the percent distance from a municipal-
ity’s population to the population value at the cutoff, using the cutoff value for the nearest threshold
to the municipality. This allows all thresholds to be pooled to have a single indicator variable for
whether municipalities lie to the right or the left of a threshold. Because pooling observations from
different regions from the support of the running variable may increase the variance of the outcome
variable (Eggers et al., 2015), threshold and year fixed effects are subtracted from every observation.
Specifically, in the sample of Finnish municipalities, observations are pooled from the thresholds
at two, four, eight, fifteen, and thirty thousand people. In the sample of German municipalities,
observations are pooled from the thresholds at three, five, and ten thousand people.11
Finnish Municipalities
The estimates from Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) indicated that an increase in council size
would cause a decrease in municipal per capita expenditures between 1.4 and 2.1 percent. Looking
at the RD estimates in Table 2.6, from regressions including controls for population composition
and wealth of the municipality, I notice that several of the estimates lie within the range suggested
by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), specifically those from regressions without higher order terms for the
running variable. However, these estimates are largely susceptible to the degree of the polynomial
11Higher thresholds are omitted due to the low number of observations around the cutoffs (see Figure 2.5).
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used for the running variable and to the size of the window around the population thresholds.
Moreover, none of the estimates are statistically significant.
Table 2.7 reports RD estimates similar to those from Table 2.6 when allowing for a more
flexible functional form for the running variable (see Equation 2.10). Looking at the estimates in the
second row, those from regressions with controls and ln(expenditures) as the dependent variable,
I notice that these estimates are more robust than those from Table 2.6 and still range within
the estimates found by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012). However, none of the estimates are statistically
significant, and their magnitude still changes with the polynomial used for the random variable.
Table 2.8 reports parameter estimates for the effect of council size using Equation 2.11,
which allows for the effect of the treatment to be different at each threshold. Notice that the
results from this specification are substantially different from the estimates obtained when pooling
all thresholds. For instance, the effect of a change in council size on ln(expenditures) is positive
at the first two thresholds, inconsistent at the third threshold, and mostly negative at the last two
thresholds. In particular, the estimates at the fifteen and thirty thousand person thresholds are
statistically significant for specifications without higher order polynomials for the running variable.
However, the magnitude of the estimates is too large to be plausible, suggesting that an increase in
council size from 35 to 43 representatives leads to a 30 percentage point decrease on expenditures,
perhaps the result of the small sample size in the neighborhood of these thresholds (see Figure 2.5).
Municipalities from Hesse
I now turn to the RD estimates for the sample of municipalities from Hesse. Recall that
Garmann (2015) found a negative effect of council size on material spending between 5.4 and 8.4
percent in municipalities with elected managers. Similar to the discussion for Finland, I look first at
the RD estimates obtained from Equation 2.8, which are reported in Table 2.9. Specifically, the last
row in the table reports the RD estimates on material spending in municipalities with elected mayors.
Consistent with Garmann (2015), all RD estimates are negative. However, most of the estimates
are not statistically significant, and for a given window size, they are not robust to changes in the
degree of polynomial used for the running variable.
The RD estimates for Equation 2.10 are reported in Table 2.10. Recall that these estimates
are similar to those from Equation 2.8 except that the specification allows for a more flexible func-
tional form for the running variable. Nonetheless, the estimates in the last row of this table are
similar to those from the last row in Table 2.9. The estimates are consistently negative, with half
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being statistically significant. However, the estimates are not robust to the degree of polynomial
used for the running variable and in some cases report an effect of council size twice as large as the
one found by Garmann (2015).
Table 2.11 reports the RD estimates for Equation 2.11. The lower panel reports the effect
on material spending from a change in the number of representatives at the three, five, and ten
thousand person thresholds. Similar to the case of Finnish municipalities, these estimates are too
large to be plausible. For instance, an increase from 15 to 23 representatives causes a decrease in
material spending of approximately 45.8 percentage points. Moreover, almost half of the estimates
are not statistically significant, and their magnitude remains susceptible to the degree of polynomial
for the running variable.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper tests the hypothesis that an increase in the number of representatives in local
governments leads to better oversight of the executive by the council. The analysis builds on those
conducted by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015), who used data from municipal gov-
ernments in Finland and the German State of Hesse to estimate the effect of changes in council size
on municipal public finances. In particular, they used Fixed Effects and OLS estimators to obtain
estimates of the effect of council size.
However, since the size of municipal councils in Finland and Hesse is determined using a
discontinuous function of population, estimating the effect of council size using an RD design is a
more efficient approach because it incorporates the information of the data generating process. Thus,
RD estimates are obtained for the effect of a change in council size for the sample of municipalities
in Finland and Germany previously studied by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Garmann (2015).
These RD estimates fail to reject the null hypothesis that the effect of council size on mu-
nicipal expenditures is zero, a result in contrast with those from Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and
Garmann (2015), both of whom found a negative and statistically significant effect of council size
on total expenditures. I reconcile these differences by showing that (a) the OLS estimator used
by Garmann (2015) is inappropriate because it estimates the effect of council size using artificial
variation generated by modeling the relation between council size and population using the wrong
functional form and (b) the FE estimator used by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) is inefficient because it
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addresses the concern that time-invariant omitted variables might be correlated with the treatment
of interest. However, in an RD design the zero-conditional mean assumption is trivially satisfied.
Moreover, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) also uses the wrong functional form to model the relation be-
tween within-municipality variation in council size and within-municipality variation in population.
The discussion presented here suggests several areas for future research. First, more research
is needed on how to address situations in empirical work where the data generating process is
consistent with an RDD but treatment is assigned at multiple thresholds, sample size is small, and
when the running variable has no continued support. For instance, recent work addressing some
of these issues includes Eggers et al. (2015), Cattaneo et al. (2016), and Bertanha (2016). Second,
to the best of my knowledge, only Lee and Lemieux (2010) raise the subject that RD designs are
closer to a data generating process than to an estimation method. In light of this suggestion, more
research is needed to determine if other estimators can be used to estimate the effect of treatment
outside the traditional parametric and non-parametric RD specifications when the data generating
process is an RD design.
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Table 2.1: Finland’s Population Thresholds.
Population Threshold Council Seats Share of Municipalities (%)
≤ 2,000 17 12.53
2,001 - 4,000 21 28.64
4,001 - 8,000 27 29.67
8,001 - 15,000 35 18.41
15,001 - 30,000 43 7.42
30,001 - 60,000 51 1.02
60,001 - 120,000 59 1.28
120,001 - 250,000 67 0.77
250,0001 - 400,000 75 0
≥ 400,001 85 0.26
Note: Taken from Pettersson-Lidbom (2012).
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Table 2.2: Hesse’s Population Thresholds.
Population Threshold Council Seats Share of Municipalities (%)
≤ 3,000 15 8.86
3,001 - 5,000 23 20.36
5,001 - 10,000 31 33.86
10,001 - 25,000 37 29.40
25,001 - 50,000 45 4.58
50,001 - 100,000 59 1.64
100,001 - 250,000 71 0.70
250,001 - 500,000 81 0.23
500,0001 - 1,000,000 93 0.23
≥ 1000,000,001 105 0
Note: Taken from Garmann (2015).
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Table 2.3: Replicating Pettersson-Lidbom’s (2012) Results
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Window OLS FE RDD No. Obs
f(pop)=1st f(pop)=2nd f(pop)=3rd
All Obs 0.210*** -0.199*** -0.166*** -0.148*** -0.079** 10,166
(0.023) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.039)
25% -0.073* -0.087** -0.084** 7,208
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037)
10% -0.072** -0.077** -0.069* 2,849
(0.036) (0.037) (0.039)
5% -0.100** -0.100** -0.101** 1,536
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
2.5% -0.095 -0.095 -0.092 778
(0.071) (0.072) (0.070)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Std. errors clustered by municipality. The dependent variable in all regressions corresponds to per capita expenditures in
natural log. All regressions include controls for municipality wealth, age composition of the population, and year fixed effects.
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Table 2.4: Replicating Garmann’s (2015) results for the effect of council size on
total expenditures
Sample OLS RDD No. Obs.
f(pop)=3rd f(pop)=4th f(pop)=5th
Parameter estimates effect of council size when manager is appointed (β)
All Obs 0.007*** -0.005 -0.006* -0.006* 6,308
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
25% 0.003 -0.007* -0.007* -0.007 4,204
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
20% 0.003 -0.007* -0.007* -0.006 3,464
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
10% 0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 1,816
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Parameter estimates effect of council size when manager is elected (β + γ)
All Obs 0.0017 -0.008* -0.01** -0.0098** 6,308
(0.0015) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043)
25% -0.0014 -0.0103** -0.0099* -0.0083 4,204
(0.0017) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0056)
20% -0.0011 -0.0093* -0.0094* -0.0077 3,464
(0.0018) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0056)
10% -0.0035 -0.0061 -0.0069 -0.0068 1,816
(0.0025) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0058)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Std. errors clustered by municipality. The dependent variable in all regressions corresponds to per capita total expenditures
in natural log. All regressions include year fixed effects and controls for the proportion of the population younger than fifteen
and older than sixty-five.
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Table 2.5: Replicating Garmann’s (2015) results for the effect of council size on
material spending
Sample OLS RDD No. Obs.
f(pop)=3rd f(pop)=4th f(pop)=5th
Parameter estimates effect of council size when manager is appointed (β)
All Obs 0.004** -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 6,308
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
25% 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 4,204
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
20% 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 3,464
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
10% 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.001 1,816
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Parameter estimates effect of council size when manager is elected (β + γ)
All Obs -0.0018 -0.0135** -0.0141** -0.0137** 6,308
(0.0019) (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0057)
25% -0.0031 -0.0168*** -0.015** -0.0163** 4,204
(0.0021) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0066)
20% -0.0027 -0.0159** -0.0147** -0.0148** 3,464
(0.0021) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0065)
10% -0.0015 -0.013* -0.0147** -0.0146** 1,816
(0.0029) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0067)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Std. errors clustered by municipality. The dependent variable in all regressions corresponds to per capita material spending
in natural log. All regressions include year fixed effects and controls for the proportion of the population younger than fifteen
and older than sixty-five.
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Table 2.6: RDD parameter estimates for Finnish municipalities: pooling all thresh-
olds
Window 25% 15% 10% 5% 2.50%
Population polynomial 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st
Dep. var: ln(expenditures)
Without controls -0.016 -0.014 0.015 -0.018 0.011 -0.004 -0.009 -0.016 -0.005
(0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.018) (0.028) (0.021) (0.032) (0.030) (0.044)
With controls -0.013 -0.014 0.006 -0.021 0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.017 -0.015
(0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.017) (0.025) (0.020) (0.031) (0.028) (0.041)
Observations 7,078 7,078 7,078 4,108 4,108 2,826 2,826 1,520 794
Dep. var: ln(operating expenditures)
Without controls -0.015 -0.014 0.011 -0.014 0.004 -0.006 -0.016 -0.019 -0.010
(0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.020) (0.031) (0.029) (0.044)
With controls -0.014 -0.016 0.004 -0.017 0.003 -0.007 -0.014 -0.020 -0.015
(0.017) (0.020) (0.025) (0.017) (0.025) (0.019) (0.031) (0.028) (0.042)
Observations 7,020 7,020 7,020 4,098 4,098 2,820 2,820 1,516 790
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All parameter estimates correspond to τ from equation 2.8. All regressions included threshold and year fixed effects. Controls
included correspond measures of wealth and population composition of the municipalities taken from Pettersson-Lidbom
(2012). Std. errors are clustered by municipality. I decided not to express the dependent variables in per capita terms
(contrary to Pettersson-Lidbom (2012)) because of the polynomials for population included in the right hand side of the
equation. However, the results are unaffected by the use of dependent variables in per capita terms, the main difference
is that the estimates for population are not statistically significant when the dependent variable is expressed in per capita
terms.
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Table 2.7: RDD parameter estimates for Finnish municipalities: pooling all thresh-
olds & allowing for flexible functional form of the running variable
Window 25% 15% 10% 5% 2.50%
Population polynomial 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st
Dep. var: ln(expenditures)
Without controls -0.018 -0.021 -0.020 0.007 -0.005 -0.010 -0.018 -0.012
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.027) (0.021) (0.033) (0.029) (0.044)
With controls -0.016 -0.022 -0.023 0.006 -0.008 -0.010 -0.022 -0.021
(0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.025) (0.020) (0.031) (0.028) (0.041)
Observations 7,078 7,078 4,108 4,108 2,826 2,826 1,520 794
Dep. var: ln(operating expenditures)
Without controls -0.017 -0.022 -0.017 -0.003 -0.009 -0.022 -0.023 -0.023
(0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.027) (0.021) (0.032) (0.029) (0.046)
With controls -0.017 -0.024 -0.019 -0.004 -0.010 -0.022 -0.025 -0.027
(0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.025) (0.019) (0.031) (0.028) (0.044)
Observations 7,020 7,020 4,098 4,098 2,820 2,820 1,516 790
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All parameter estimates correspond to τ from equation 2.10. All regressions included threshold and year fixed effects.
Controls included correspond measures of wealth and population composition of the municipalities taken from Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012). Std. errors are clustered by municipality. I decided not to express the dependent variables in per capita
terms (contrary to Pettersson-Lidbom (2012)) because of the polynomials for population included in the right hand side of
the equation. However, the results are unaffected by the use of dependent variables in per capita terms, the main difference
is that the estimates for population are not statistically significant when the dependent variable is expressed in per capita
terms.
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Table 2.8: RDD parameter estimates for Finnish municipalities: allowing the effect
to be different across thresholds
Dep. Var ln(expenditures) ln(operating expenditures)
Population polynomial 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
β2 - from 17 to 21 seats 0.079 0.155 0.473** 0.103 0.145 0.453**
(0.084) (0.132) (0.190) (0.084) (0.142) (0.188)
β3 - from 21 to 27 seats 0.046 0.246* 0.150 0.056 0.229* 0.287
(0.058) (0.149) (0.271) (0.054) (0.136) (0.242)
β4 - from 27 to 35 seats 0.029 -0.266** 0.062 0.008 -0.236* -0.019
(0.053) (0.133) (0.196) (0.055) (0.132) (0.185)
β5 - from 35 to 43 seats -0.309*** -0.108 0.955 -0.282** -0.207 0.730
(0.104) (0.419) (1.213) (0.113) (0.451) (1.288)
β6 - from 43 to 51 seats -0.303*** -0.243 0.421 -0.320*** -0.277 0.349
(0.056) (0.215) (0.656) (0.062) (0.225) (0.650)
Observations 9,922 9,922 9,922 9,844 9,844 9,844
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All parameter estimates correspond to those from equation 2.11. All regressions included threshold and year fixed effects.
Controls included correspond measures of wealth and population composition of the municipalities taken from Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012). Std. errors are clustered by municipality. I decided not to express the dependent variables in per capita
terms (contrary to Pettersson-Lidbom (2012)) because of the polynomials for population included in the right hand side of
the equation. However, the results are unaffected by the use of dependent variables in per capita terms, the main difference
is that the estimates for population are not statistically significant when the dependent variable is expressed in per capita
terms.
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Table 2.9: RDD parameter estimates for municipalities in the state of Hesse: pooling
all Thresholds
Dependent Variable 25% wdw 20% wdw 10% wdw
f(pop)=1st f(pop)=2nd f(pop)=1st f(pop)=2nd f(pop)=1st f(pop)=2nd
Parameter estimates effect of council size when manager is appointed (β)
ln(expenditures) -0.019 -0.020 -0.016 -0.032 -0.043 0.038
(0.0379) (0.0573) (0.0413) (0.064) (0.061) (0.0854)
ln(personnel spending) -0.025 -0.043 -0.035 -0.033 -0.034 0.000
(0.0372) (0.0571) (0.0395) (0.0652) (0.0636) (0.0956)
ln(material spending) 0.017 0.036 0.031 0.009 0.027 -0.007
(0.0389) (0.0559) (0.0411) (0.0616) (0.0565) (0.0892)
Parameter estimates effect of council size when manager is elected (β + γ)
ln(expenditures) -0.0145 -0.0459 -0.0173 -0.0936 -0.0775 -0.0813
(0.0056) (0.0368) (0.0072) (0.1369) (0.0984) (0.0774)
ln(personnel spending) 0.00836 -0.0303 -0.0187 -0.0176 -0.0288 0.0175
(0.0019) (0.0161) (0.0089) (0.0048) (0.013) (0.0032)
ln(material spending) -0.0306 -0.111** -0.0492 -0.0922 -0.0895 -0.164*
(0.0241) (0.2204) (0.0588) (0.138) (0.1417) (0.3014)
Observations 4,060 4,060 3,464 3,464 1,816 1,816
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Std. errors clustered by municipality. All regressions include threshold and year fixed effects to mean difference the dependent
variable with its average value within thresholds and years. RDD parameter estimates for samples with appointed and elected
managers were estimated jointly by interacting the covariates in equation 2.8 with an indicator equal to one for periods when
the manager was elected and zero otherwise. I decided not to express the dependent variables in per capita terms (contrary
to Garmann (2015)) because of the polynomials for population included in the right hand side of the equation. However,
the results are unaffected by the use of dependent variables in per capita terms, the main difference is that the estimates for
population are not statistically significant when the dependent variable is expressed in per capita terms.
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Table 2.10: RDD parameter estimates for municipalities in the state of Hesse: pooling
all thresholds & allowing for flexible functional form of the running variable
Dependent Variable 25% wdw 20% wdw 10% wdw
f(pop)=1st f(pop)=2nd f(pop)=1st f(pop)=2nd f(pop)=1st f(pop)=2nd
Parameter estimates effect of council size when manager is appointed (β)
ln(expenditures) -0.026 -0.020 -0.019 -0.029 -0.043 0.036
(0.033) (0.041) (0.033) (0.045) (0.041) (0.059)
ln(personnel spending) -0.028 -0.040 -0.037 -0.029 -0.032 0.007
(0.032) (0.039) (0.032) (0.042) (0.039) (0.062)
ln(material spending) 0.020 0.036 0.031 0.011 0.024 -0.003
(0.036) (0.043) (0.037) (0.048) (0.044) (0.069)
Parameter estimates effect of council size when manager is elected (β + γ)
ln(expenditures) -0.016 -0.047 -0.02 -0.082 -0.078 -0.073
(0.0373) (0.054) (0.0402) (0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0847)
ln(personnel spending) 0.006 -0.038 -0.02 -0.017 -0.023 0.03
(0.0375) (0.0567) (0.0397) (0.0653) (0.0657) (0.0928)
ln(material spending) -0.034 -0.114** -0.056 -0.093 -0.093* -0.154*
(0.0385) (0.0543) (0.0403) (0.0613) (0.0556) (0.0857)
Observations 4,060 4,060 3,464 3,464 1,816 1,816
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Std. errors clustered by municipality. RDD parameter estimates for samples with appointed and elected managers were
estimated jointly by interacting the covariates in equation 2.8 with an indicator equal to one for periods when the manager
was elected and zero otherwise. I decided not to express the dependent variables in per capita terms (contrary to Garmann
(2015)) because of the polynomials for population included in the right hand side of the equation. However, the results are
unaffected by the use of dependent variables in per capita terms, the main difference is that the estimates for population are
not statistically significant when the dependent variable is expressed in per capita terms.
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Table 2.11: RDD parameter estimates for municipalities in the State of Hesse: allow-
ing the effect to be different across thresholds
Dep. Var ln(expenditures) ln(material spending)
Population polynomial 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
Estimates effect of council size when manager is appointed (β)
β2 - from 15 to 23 seats -0.018 0.121 0.966 -0.077 -0.151 0.198
(0.125) (0.334) (0.778) (0.111) (0.333) (0.750)
β3 - from 23 to 31 seats -0.083 -0.064 0.171 -0.037 0.077 -0.147
(0.077) (0.160) (0.209) (0.098) (0.228) (0.305)
β4 - from 31 to 37 seats -0.183* -0.073 -2.192** -0.235 0.278 -0.939
(0.110) (0.436) (0.942) (0.147) (0.481) (1.099)
Observations 4,238 4,238 4,238 4,238 4,238 4,238
Estimates effect of council size when manager is elected (β + γ)
β2 - from 15 to 23 seats 0.031 -0.193 1.584 -0.458*** -0.773 1.083
(0.134) (0.458) (1.392) (0.165) (0.557) (1.445)
β3 - from 23 to 31 seats -0.091 -0.072 -0.011 -0.253** -0.211** -0.134**
(0.091) (0.097) (0.061) (0.116) (0.100) (0.061)
β4 - from 31 to 37 seats -0.223 -0.241 -2.171** -0.241 -0.056 0.704
(0.145) (0.576) (0.994) (0.164) (0.625) (0.958)
Observations 2,070 2,070 2,070 2,070 2,070 2,070
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Std. errors clustered by municipality. RDD parameter estimates for samples with appointed and elected managers were
estimated separately. I decided not to express the dependent variables in per capita terms (contrary to Garmann (2015))
because of the polynomials for population included in the right hand side of the equation. However, the results are unaffected
by the use of dependent variables in per capita terms, the main difference is that the estimates for population are not
statistically significant when the dependent variable is expressed in per capita terms.
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Figure 2.1: Observed and predicted values for a linear regression of Council Size on
Population Estimates of German Municipalities
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Note: Observations and predicted values reported in panel (a) correspond to the sample of municipality-year observations
with an appointed manager. Those in panel (b) correspond to the sample of observations with an elected manager.
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Figure 2.2: RD plots for Finland
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Note: Plots report average values for municipal expenditures within non-overlapping bins to the left and the right
of a population threshold. Each RD plot was separately computed to avoid double-counting observations. Bins are
computed using the quantile spaced (IMSE-QS) partitioning scheme introduced by Calonico et al. (2015)
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Figure 2.3: RD plots for Hesse: Appointed Managers
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
ln
(e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s)
9.727535ln(3001) ln(5001) ln(10001)
ln(population)
Note: Plots report average values for municipal expenditures within non-overlapping bins to the left and the right
of a population threshold. Each RD plot was separately computed to avoid double-counting observations. Bins are
computed using the quantile spaced (IMSE-QS) partitioning scheme introduced by Calonico et al. (2015)
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Figure 2.4: RD plots for Hesse: Elected Managers
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Note: Plots report average values for municipal expenditures within non-overlapping bins to the left and the right
of a population threshold. Each RD plot was separately computed to avoid double-counting observations. Bins are
computed using the quantile spaced (IMSE-QS) partitioning scheme introduced by Calonico et al. (2015)
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Figure 2.5: Population Histograms for Finland
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Note: Frequency histograms of the running variable for the two, four, eight, fifteen, thirty and sixty thousand people
thresholds using observations in a twenty-five percent window around the cutoff value. The running variable is
expressed as the population distance from each municipality to its nearest threshold.
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Figure 2.6: Population Histograms for Hesse
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Note: Frequency histograms of the running variable for the three, five, ten, twenty-five, fifty, and one-hundred thousand
people thresholds using observations in a twenty-four percent window around the cutoff value. The running variable
is expressed as the population distance from each municipality to its nearest threshold.
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Chapter 3
The effect of changes in the
number of elected representatives
on public finances: Empirical
evidence from Costa Rica
3.1 Introduction
The last three decades have seen a general trend towards decentralization, not only among
developing countries but also in the developed world (Falleti, 2005; Faguet and Sa´nchez, 2014).
Because in many cases this process entails the transfer of responsibilities such as the provision
of education, health, water, transportation, and assistance to the poor from the central to the
sub-national governments, a concern is whether local governments are able to handle these new
responsibilities. Proponents of these reforms suggest that decentralization will increase transparency
by bridging the gap between constituents and representatives. However, critics suggest that in
countries with poor governance, this transfer of responsibilities might increase corruption because
of the increased access to resources it affords the local elites (Bardhan, 2002).
Recent evidence suggests that the quality of local institutions is positively associated with
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the success of decentralization reforms
This paper focuses on a different channel that could be used to strengthen the accountability
of local officials; namely, the division of power at the local level. Most local governments in developing
countries are overseen by a mayor and a deliberative body of local representatives (referred to here
as the council). It is possible that in proportional-representation electoral systems, an increase
in the number of representatives might lead to an increase in the number of small parties that
gain representation on the council (Reilly et al., 2005). To explore this possibility, this paper uses
data from local governments in Costa Rica to estimate the effect of a change in the number of
representatives on public finances. Costa Rican local governments are an interesting subject for
testing this hypothesis because council members are elected through a proportional-representation
system and through closed party lists so that citizens vote for parties, not individual candidates.
For practical purposes this means that an increase in the number of representatives often increases
the number of parties represented on the council.
In addition, the number of representatives in Costa Rican municipalities is determined
using a discontinuous function of population. This allows for an implementation of a Regression
Discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the effect of an increase in the number of representatives.
An RD approach is particularly helpful when analyzing institutional variables, such as number
of representatives, which do not vary much over time. It is also closer to a randomized designed
than estimates obtained using instrumental variables or matching methods (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
However, the implementation of an RD design in this sample is susceptible to small sample problems
due to the small number of municipalities in Costa Rica. To partially address this limitation, I use
a parametric specification that uses observations from a broad window around the discontinuity.
Overall, there is no evidence that changes in the number of representatives affect tax col-
lection efforts or the amount of expenditures on municipal services, investment projects, and the
administration of the municipality. This could be the result of having outcome measures so broad
that fail to capture the outcomes of the council, a small sample size that prevents identification,
or that the decision-making process in the council is unaffected by the addition of members from
different parties.1
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents detailed information about the
1Anecdotal evidence from Costa Rica suggests that decisions made by the council require approval of a two-third
majority and that representatives vote by parties. Both of these facts would suggest that even a single seat in the
council could carry substantial weight in the decision-making process.
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organization of local governments in Costa Rica, the role of municipal councils, and the budget
process. Section 3.3 describes the data and provides summary statistics for the main variables.
Section 3.4 introduces the estimation strategy and provides evidence that the estimation approach
is appropriate for the sample. Section 3.5 reports and discusses the results, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Operation of Local Governments in Costa Rica
Costa Rica has a presidential form of government, with the president and the legislature
being elected every four years by popular vote. For administrative purposes Costa Rica’s territory
is divided into seven provinces, which are then further subdivided into 81 cantones and 470 districts
(see Figure 3.1). In addition to the central government there are subnational governments for each
canton, referred to as municipalities and administered by a deliberative body denominated council
and a mayor, both elected by popular vote. According to the municipal code established by Costa
Rica’s national legislature, the main roles of the municipal council are to review and evaluate the
plan of government prepared by the mayor, approve the prices charged for municipal services, review
the municipal budget presented by the mayor, and propose to the national assembly the passage of
new laws of municipal interest.
Similarly, the mayor’s responsibilities include attending to all council meetings (without
the ability to vote), passing or vetoing the resolutions and agreements approved by the municipal
council (with some exceptions), presenting to the council a plan of government at the beginning of
his/her administration, presenting to the council every six months a report of approved expenditures,
presenting to the council a proposal for the municipality’s annual budget, assigning and removing
the personnel of the municipality, and serving as the legal representative of the municipality.
Similar to other countries in Central America, Costa Rica has a strong central government
and weak municipal governments. As Morales (2010) points out, spending by the central government
in 2008 amounted to 15.7% of the national GDP, whereas spending by local governments amounted
to 1.16% of the GDP. This is a sharp contrast with respect to more developed countries. For instance,
according to Garmann (2015) spending by municipal governments in Germany amounts to one-third
of the total government expenditures.
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3.2.1 The Electoral Process
Municipal councils are elected through a proportional representation system with closed-
party lists whereas mayors are elected using majority rule. Prior to 2002 mayors were appointed by
municipal councils. This changed with a reform to the municipal code effectuated in 1998 and that
came into effect in 2002. Among other things the reform allowed for the popular election of mayors.
So far, there have been four elections for mayors during the years 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2016.2
A RD design is possible because the number of council seats in each municipality is assigned
using a discontinuous function of population. Table 3.1 reports the number of council seats corre-
sponding to each population threshold as well as the share of municipality-year observations with a
given council size. The thresholds in table 3.1 are used to determine the number of council seats.
Although population is a criterion for the amount of transfers each municipality receives from the
central government, such transfers are not allocated based on population thresholds. This is relevant
for the validity of my estimation strategy because the existence of multiple treatments at a given
population threshold would require for the effect of one treatment to be untangled from the others.3
3.2.2 Municipal Revenues and Expenses
The main sources of revenue for municipal governments are taxes, payments from services
provided (i.e., garbage collection), leases, credit, and transfers from the central government. The
primary sources of tax revenue are the property tax (Impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) and a patent
tax on businesses, both of which are collected by municipalities.4
Most expenditures incurred by municipal governments fall into three categories: adminis-
trative expenses, communal services, and investments in infrastructure. According to Rojas (2008),
the main services provided by municipalities are maintenance of streets and roads, garbage collec-
tion, maintenance of cemeteries and parks, administration of public markets, the maintenance of the
2Prior to 2016 the elections for mayors had not taken place at the same time as the elections for council members.
In particular, council members were elected during the presidential and national legislature elections in the month of
February whereas mayors were elected on the first Sunday of December. This meant that mayors took office a year
after the council. Thus, the elections for municipal governments that were due in 2014 were canceled and re-scheduled
for 2016. This was the result o a major reform that seek to divorce the election of municipal councils from the elections
of the central government and to allow for mayors and municipal councils to be elected at the same time.
3See Ade and Freier (2011) for a discussion about the use of population thresholds on regression discontinuity
designs.
4The property tax is currently computed as 0.25% of the value of a property. Moreover, out of the total revenues
collected from the property tax the municipality must transfer 10% to the canton’s education committee, 3% to the
administrative committee of the national cadastre and 1% to Costa Rica’s Internal Revenue Office (Ministerio de
Hacienda).
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sewage system, and the construction of sidewalks and roads.
3.2.3 The Budget Process
The budget process for municipal governments in Costa Rica can be thought of as having
three stages. First, the mayor prepares a proposal of the budget. At this stage the mayor has
freedom in proposing the size of the budget and the distribution of expenditures in different cate-
gories. However, the size of the budget should be consistent with expected revenue and proposed
expenditures should follow the plan of government that the mayor presented at the beginning of her
administration.
By the end of August the budget proposal is sent to the municipal council. The council
then organizes a commission to review the budget (usually made up of council members and outside
advisors) which can make adjustments to both the size of the budget and the distribution of expen-
ditures. The amended budget must be approved by a majority of the council members by the end of
September and then sent to the Government Auditing Office (Contraloria General de la Repu´blica)
for final approval.
Thus, the mayor has no veto powers over the changes made to the budget by the council.
Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that most disagreements between the mayor and the council (or
between council members) are related with the amount of expenditures in particular projects. This
is consistent with the idea that council members try to incorporate projects for their constituents or
a particular interest group. However, contrary to the traditional common pool problem, the council
is not free to increase the size of the budget indiscriminately, since it would run the risk of having
the Government Auditing Office reject the budget. In such a scenario, the municipality would have
to implement the budget from the previous year.5
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
Information about the expenditures of municipal governments was obtained from Costa
Rica’s Government Auditing Office (Contralor´ıa General de la Repu´blica) and is available for all 81
municipalities. The electoral data regarding the number of council seats in every municipality as well
5While municipalities can make adjustments to the budget after it has been approved by the Government Auditing
Office, the number of adjustments is limited to four per year and each adjustment must also be approved by the
Government Auditing Office.
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as the results from municipal elections were obtained from Costa Rica’s Tribunal Supremo Electoral
(TSE) which is the entity responsible for organizing and conducting the elections. Demographic
information and data on the value of new construction projects were obtained from the National
Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC).
The dataset includes information for all municipalities during the period 2006-2014. How-
ever, this paper focuses only on municipalities with councils of five, seven, and nine seats because
96.3% of the observations fall in these categories. Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for the main
variables organized by council size. For instance, the upper panel in Table 3.2 reports average values
for geographic and sociodemographic characteristics. Notice that there are no major differences in
the demographic composition among municipalities with fewer or more representatives, in terms of
age composition of the population or teenage pregnancies.
The middle panel in Table 3.2 reports the shares of municipal expenditures and revenues
from different sources. It is worth noting that more populous municipalities spend a larger fraction
of their budget on services. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence from Costa Rica suggesting
that larger municipalities provide more services such as police and museums. Note also that local
tax revenues represent a larger fraction of the revenues received by municipalities. This is consistent
with the literature of local governments in Latin America and reflects the fact that municipalities in
Costa Rica provide a limited number of services. In countries such as Colombia and Bolivia where
decentralization has increased the number of responsibilities bestowed on local governments, the
fraction of revenues received from intergovernmental transfers is much larger because most decen-
tralization processes in Latin America have struggled with raising the revenue-generating capabilities
of the municipalities.
Table 3.2 also reports summary statistics for the political composition of the council. Over-
all, larger councils have members from more parties and a smaller share of seats held by local parties.
In particular, Costa Rica’s political landscape is dominated at the local level by two major parties,
the National Liberation and the Social Christian Unity parties. For instance, about 88% of the
mayors elected during my sample belong to one of these parties. For the reader’s convenience, table
3.3 reports summary statistics for the same variables but for the entire sample.
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3.4 Estimation Strategy
A causal effect of council size in Costa Rica can be estimated by a RD design because
council seats are assigned using a discontinuous function of population (see table 3.1. This approach
is appealing because is much closer to a randomized design than other evaluation strategies such
as IV’s (Lee and Lemieux (2010)). In particular, a RD design would be valid provided that: there
are no other co-treatments at the population thresholds and localities do not have precise control
over the treatment. That is, municipalities can not precisely sort themselves on a given side of the
population threshold. The next section provides evidence that both of these conditions hold in the
sample.
Following Lee and Lemieux (2010) I implement an estimation strategy that consists of two
local regressions, one on each side of the threshold. The pooled regression equation is the following
ln(yit) = αl + αdDit + βlf(popit) + βdf(popit)Dit + Xitβ + τt + εit (3.1)
where indexes i and t refer to municipality i and time period t, respectively. Define yi,t as per capita
municipal expenditures, popi,t as the relevant population at the municipality (expressed as share of
the national population), Dit is an indicator variable equal to one for observations at the right of
the threshold and zero otherwise, and Xit is a vector of additional controls related with population
(e.g., the share of people more than 65 years old).
3.4.1 Validity of the RD Design
As mentioned in the previous section, a RD design is only appropriate if municipalities
have no precise control over the assignment variable and if there are no other co-treatments at the
thresholds. This section presents supporting evidence that these assumptions hold in my sample.
The assignment variable in my sample corresponds to the population estimates for the
years before the elections, since the number of council seats to be contested are allocated a year
in advance of the elections. In the sample, these are the population estimates for the years 2005
and 2009. The histogram for these population estimates is presented in panel (a) of figure 3.2 for
all municipalities in Costa Rica. Notice that most of the municipalities have less than 4% of the
national population. In particular, 96.2% of the observations are below the 4% threshold and 91.7%
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have less than 3% of the national population. Thus, in order to guarantee that there are some
observations in the neighborhood of the thresholds, the analysis focuses on municipalities with at
most 3% of the national population. A histogram for the reduced sample is presented in panel (b)
of figure 3.2.6
Examining Confounded Treatments
There is no specific test to assess for the existence of confounded treatments other than
a careful and thorough review of the operation of local governments. I reviewed the regulation
determining government transfers, the salary of the mayor, the salary of the council, and access to
credit by the municipalities; and found that none of these variables are a function of the population
thresholds from table 3.1.
Moreover, because the current population thresholds were introduced through a reform to
the municipal code in 1998, I reviewed the records of the meeting in which the national legislature ap-
proved the new code to get a sense of whether the new thresholds were the result of gerrymandering.
From the records of the meeting it is clear that the main changes, as perceived by most legislators,
were that: 1) the code revoked the ability of the council to appoint and remove the mayor, now
elected by popular vote, 2) district councils previously appointed by the municipal council were to
be elected by popular vote, and 3) the elections of the mayor and district councils were set to occur
at a different month but during the same electoral year as the presidential elections. There was no
evidence that the population thresholds were a central subject in the reform to the municipal code.
Moreover, the legislator who drafted the new municipal code belonged to a party which lost seats
in most municipalities due to the transition to the new code.
Examining Sorting
To test for the possibility that municipalities have precise control over the assignment vari-
able, I examine histograms of the population distance from each municipality to the threshold. In
particular, a change in the density of municipalities in the neighborhood of the threshold would
be indicative that some municipalities have precise control over the assignment variable (Lee and
Lemieux, 2010).
Figure 3.2 reports histograms for the population distance of the assignment variable around
the 1% and 2% population thresholds. Notice that there is no evidence of changes in the density
6In Costa Rica, population estimates for each municipality are not collected every year but rather build out of the
most recent census. The estimates are prepared by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC) and the
Central American Center for Population (CCP).
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of the assignment variable at either of the thresholds. Moreover, the histogram for observations in
the neighborhood of the 2% threshold indicates that inference about the effect of council size would
require extrapolation from observations away of the cutoff.
Examining distribution of additional covariates
Continuity of other baseline covariates at the threshold is usually considered a good test for
the assumption that variation in the treatment is approximately randomized. The idea is simple,
if local governments do not have precise control over the assignment variable then the distribution
of baseline covariates at the threshold should be continuous. With this mind, I test for difference
of means on measures of demographic composition and wealth of the municipalities around the 1%
threshold (since this is my preferred specification).
Table 3.4 reports the p-values for tests of difference of means for the baseline covariates,
each column in the table refers to a different window size around the 1% threshold. For instance,
column two includes all observations around the 1% threshold but below the 2% threshold, this is
the broadest window. On the other hand, column six includes all municipalities with more than
0.9% but less than 1.1% of the national population, this is the smallest window. The last two rows
in the table indicate the number of observations to the right and to the left of the threshold for each
window size.
The first four covariates in Table 3.4 are directly related with the assignment variable. As
the analysis moves from the largest to the smallest window, the differences in average values between
observations below and above the threshold become statistically significant for share of population
over sixty-five, share of population younger than fifteen, and share of new births from teenagers.
The fact that the population composition variables are statistically different in the neighborhood of
the threshold could be the result of the small sample size. Regarding the variables related with the
wealth of a municipality, such as number and value of new construction projects and total energy
consumption, I find that for large window sizes average values on each side of the threshold are
statistically different from one another but the differences fade away as the window size narrows.
I interpret these results as reflecting the bias-variance trade-off. Extending the window too
far from the threshold reduces the likelihood that the municipalities being compared are similar in
terms of baseline covariates. However, estimates from a narrow window around the threshold will be
less precise and will also be subject to bias when the sample size is too small, since every observation
will have a large weight in the estimate of the local mean. With this in mind, I keep the size of the
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window at 33% in my preferred specification.
3.5 Results
Ideally, I would like to identify the effect of council size on all the decisions taken by the
councils. In particular, recall that municipal councils in Costa Rica are responsible for: approving
and amending the budget proposed by the mayor, approving the tariffs charged for municipal ser-
vices, approving (electing sometimes) the winners of procurement auctions for municipal projects,
and developing proposals for changes in the property tax7.
Out of the outcomes mentioned above, there is only information on the expenditures and
revenues by municipal governments. Because of this, I begin by looking at changes in total expen-
ditures only. Intuitively, I would expect to find no council size effect on total expenditures since
municipalities can not freely adjust their sources of revenue. This is specially true for small munici-
palities whose primary sources of income are tax revenue and transfers from the central government.
Thus, if anything, I expect to find a council size effect for specific categories of expenditures.
For example, council members might prefer to increase spending in projects that are of benefit to
their constituencies over increasing spending in municipal services.8 If this is the case, an increase
in the number of representatives would lead to an increase in the share of investment expenditures
and a decrease on the share of expenditures in services (Weingast et al., 1981).
3.5.1 Graphical Evidence
Before looking at the parameter estimates from the RDD specification, I present RD plots
for the main variables of interest. Specifically, I construct these plots using the STATA command
introduced by Calonico et al. (2014b) which implements a quantile-spaced partitioning scheme that
constructs bins with roughly the same number of observations. This is desirable in my sample given
the sparsity of the data (see figure 3.3).
Figure 3.4 reports RD plots for municipal expenditures (in natural log), the share of munic-
ipal revenues from local taxes, and the share of expenditures on personnel and the administration of
the municipality. In particular, I look at administrative and personnel expenditures because these
7Although municipalities have the authority to collect the property tax, they cannot adjust the rate of tax. Only
the national legislature can approve for changes in the property tax of a municipality
8Notice that even if council members are elected in an at-large system, they might still have specific constituencies
that they would like to favor.
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are the areas where the mayor would have more discretion. Thus, a discontinuity in these categories
of expenditures would be consistent with a scenario where an increase in council size leads to greater
oversight of the executive (see Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012; Garmann, 2015).
The plots in figure 3.4 reveal that there is a large variability in the sample. This is partially
due to the discrete characteristic of the running variable and to the small sample size. In particular,
there is no evidence of a discontinuity at the first population threshold for the expenditure variables.
There is however some evidence of a discontinuity for the share of revenues coming from local taxes
at the 1% threshold. In particular, while there is a lot of variation on the estimates on either side
of the threshold, the estimates to the left seem to be consistently above those immediately to the
right of the threshold.
Regarding the threshold at 2%, two observations stand out. First, there is no discontinuity
at the threshold for any of the variables. While there seems to be a discontinuity for the share
of revenues from taxes, it is a product of the point estimate to the left of the threshold being
abnormally high, even relative to the rest of estimates to the left of the cutoff. More importantly, is
clear from figure 3.4 that there are no observations in the neighborhood of the threshold and that any
inference would require extrapolation from observations away from the discontinuity. Taken together,
I interpret this preliminary evidence as failing to reject the null hypothesis that an increase in the
number of representatives has no effect on municipal revenues and expenditures.
3.5.2 Parameter estimates from an RD specification
I report now parameter estimates for the effect of council size from equation 3.1. Recall that
αd is the parameter of interest, capturing the difference in the intercepts between local regressions
to the left and right of the threshold. As mentioned before, the estimated equation allows for the
effect of the assignment variable to be different on each side of the threshold, includes controls for
baseline covariates and year fixed effects, and clusters the standard errors by municipality. These
results are reported in table 3.5.
All parameter estimates in table 3.5 correspond to αd from equation 3.1. The columns
indicate the degree of polynomial used for the running variable and whether baseline covariates were
included as controls. The first five rows report estimates for regressions with different categories of
expenditures as the dependent variable and the last four rows report estimates for regressions with
different sources of revenues as the dependent variable. Notice that few parameter estimates are
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statistically significant. More important, most estimates are not robust to the inclusion of a higher
order polynomial for the assignment variable. The estimates also change substantially when baseline
covariates are included in the regression. Thus, the results from the RD specification support the
evidence from the RD plots and fail to reject the null hypothesis that a change in council size from
five to seven members in Costa Rican municipalities has an effect on municipal expenditures and
revenues.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of a change in the number of representatives on public finances
using data from municipal governments in Costa Rica. It focuses on these governments because they
share many characteristics common to local governments in developing countries. For instance, their
main sources of revenues are property taxes and intergovernmental transfers; their roles involve the
provision of basic services such as potable water and maintenance of roads, and they are governed
by a mayor and a council of representatives. My findings suggest that an increase from five to seven
representatives in municipalities with about one percent of the national population has a negligible
impact on local tax revenues and expenditures on services, personnel, and investment projects, in
spite of the fact that changes in council size lead to an increase in the number of parties on local
councils.
The lack of evidence in support of the hypothesis that changes in the composition of the
council affect the performance of these governments is probably the result of the small sample size
used in this study or of the lack of good measures for outcomes such as corruption and pork barrel
spending in these governments. Given current efforts in Costa Rica and other Latin American
governments to strengthen the role of municipalities, future research analyzing the effects of such
variables as partisanship, number of representatives, council diversity, information about public
officials, and electoral rules focusing on the performance of local governments is needed in order to
make a better case for decentralization reforms.
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Table 3.1: Costa Rica’s Population Thresholds.
Population Thresholds Council Seats No. Obs Share of Obs. Share of National Population
< 1% 5 400 61.73 29.97
1% - < 2% 7 148 22.84 25.62
2% - <4% 9 76 11.73 26.39
4% - <8% 11 20 3.09 14.39
≥ 8% 13 4 0.62 7.28
Note: Population thresholds are expressed as a percentage of the national population since 2002. Share of national population
is computed as the average share of the national population in each category over the period 2006 - 2014.
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Table 3.2: Average values for main variables by council size
Variable
No. of Representatives
5 7 9
Geographic & Demographic Variables
Population 27020.17 62066.74 112718.30
share population<15 26.38 26.12 25.63
share population>65 6.42 6.31 5.94
No. Districts 4.78 6.08 7.92
Area (km2) 513.40 700.35 1019.40
Share births from women 10-17 8.68 8.48 8.98
Value new construction (millions CRC) 3797.83 7809.91 13005.26
No. of new projects 251.13 441.22 821.04
Energy consumption (GWh) 50.19 96.64 230.88
Public Finances
Share administrative expenditures 32.32 33.52 35.88
Share investment expenditures 34.04 26.98 22.37
Share expenditures on services 28.28 34.48 39.08
Share earmarked expenditures 5.35 4.34 2.68
Share revenues from taxes 41.90 43.24 52.96
Share rev. from Central Gov. transfers 28.86 22.01 15.40
Share revenues from loans 2.22 2.22 1.16
Political Variables
No. parties in the council 3.27 4.19 4.75
HHI of parties in the council 0.37 0.30 0.27
Share of seats held by local parties 5.00 6.56 0.93
Share of seats held by the party of the mayor 41.79 36.31 36.01
Note: The sample includes all municipalities with less than three percent of the national population for the period 2006-2014.
However, some variables are not available for all years in the sample.
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Table 3.3: Average values for main variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Geographic & Demographic Variables
Population 596 42624.87 28693.95 140699.00 5590.00
share population<15 596 26.25 3.66 36.96 17.86
share population>65 596 6.35 1.38 10.11 3.07
No. Districts 596 5.36 2.52 16.00 1.00
Area (km2) 596 600.57 680.44 2809.93 6.96
Share births from women 10-17 596 8.65 3.08 18.27 0.00
Value new construction (millions CRC) 596 5535.66 7781.39 50077.58 293.54
No. of new projects 596 344.23 269.65 2277.00 50.00
Energy consumption (GWh) 596 76.27 85.31 542.65 3.78
Public Finances
Share administrative expenditures 593 32.91 8.60 71.71 0.00
Share investment expenditures 593 31.35 14.65 85.10 0.00
Share expenditures on services 593 30.69 12.08 56.98 0.00
Share earmarked expenditures 593 4.88 6.39 44.47 0.00
Share revenues from taxes 593 43.13 14.82 82.10 8.51
Share rev. from Central Gov. transfers 593 26.07 19.01 87.12 0.00
Share revenues from loans 593 2.13 4.99 33.32 0.00
Political Variables
No. parties in the council 596 3.62 0.92 6.00 2.00
HHI of parties in the council 596 0.34 0.09 0.52 0.18
Share of seats held by local parties 596 5.06 8.28 28.57 0.00
Share of seats held by the party of the mayor 596 39.96 13.10 60.00 11.11
Note: The sample includes all municipalities with less than three percent of the national population for the period 2006-2014.
However, some variables are not available for all years in the sample.
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Table 3.4: P-values for tests of difference of means for additional covariates
Window Around the 1% threshold
Variable 0 - 2% 0.5 - 1.5% 0.7 - 1.3% 0.8 - 1.2% 0.9 - 1.1%
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0179 0.1311
Share population age<15 0.3908 0.4356 0.0449 0.0000 0.0000
Share population age>65 0.3815 0.3386 0.1955 0.0163 0.0110
Share new births from women age 10-17 0.3425 0.8882 0.0712 0.0000 0.0000
Value new construction (millions CRC) 0.0000 0.0046 0.6680 0.9307 0.4963
No. of new construction projects 0.0000 0.0004 0.0265 0.1136 0.4212
Energy consumption (GWh) 0.0000 0.0015 0.3946 0.1867 0.0029
92
Table 3.5: Parameter estimates for the ATE at the 1% threshold
Variable w/o baseline covariates w/ baseline covariates Observations
f(pop)=1 f(pop)=2 f(pop)=1 f(pop)=2
ln(expenditures) -0.376 -0.047 -0.077 0.222 206
(0.250) (0.262) (0.189) (0.145)
ln(administrative expenses) -0.475* -0.377 -0.014 0.068 205
(0.243) (0.275) (0.142) (0.187)
ln(expenses on services) -0.854*** -0.354 -0.191 0.226 205
(0.303) (0.375) (0.177) (0.151)
ln(investment expenses) -0.176 0.310 -0.172 0.343 205
(0.348) (0.476) (0.311) (0.241)
ln(earmarked expenses) -0.866 1.202 -1.661 0.642 206
(1.390) (1.974) (1.977) (1.821)
ln(revenues) -0.436 -0.478 0.154 0.155 208
(0.465) (0.582) (0.494) (0.562)
ln(tax revenues) -0.709 -0.696 0.148 0.179 208
(0.435) (0.587) (0.453) (0.563)
ln(property tax revenues) -0.518 -0.470 0.210 0.201 208
(0.444) (0.528) (0.415) (0.498)
ln(central govt. transfers) -0.960 -1.735 -1.021 -1.316 208
(1.066) (1.892) (0.893) (1.514)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All parameter estimates correspond to parameter αd in equation 3.1. All regressions include year-province fixed effects.
Baseline covariates include ln(area), share of population age 15-65, share of population older than sixty-five, and ln(GWh).
Std. errors clustered by municipality.
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Figure 3.1: Provinces and Municipalities of Costa Rica
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the Assignment variable
(a) All municipalities
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Note: Width of the bins is set at 0.1 percent of the national population.
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Figure 3.3: Population Thresholds
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Note: Frequency histograms of the running variable for the thresholds at one and two percent of the national population
using observations in a thirty-three percent window around the cutoff value. The running variable is expressed as the
distance from each municipality to its nearest threshold and the width of the bins is set at 0.1 percent of the national
population.
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Figure 3.4: RD plots for populations around the 1% and 2% thresholds
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Note: Plots report average values for each covariate within non-overlapping bins to the left and the right of a
population threshold. The running variable is a the population in a municipality expressed as a percent of the
national population. Bins are computed using the quantile spaced (QS) partitioning scheme introduced by (Calonico
et al., 2015).
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Appendix A Examining the Possibility of Confounded Treat-
ments in Colombian Local Governments
A.1 Transfers from the Central Government
As mentioned in the main text, the decentralization process in Colombia culminated with the
transfer of responsibilities, from the central government to municipalities and departamentos, in the
provision of services such as water and sewerage, education, health, and road maintenance. However,
municipalities and departamentos did not have, and still lack, enough resources to cope with these
responsibilities. Because of this, the central government established a system of intergovernmental
grants.
An understanding of the system of transfers is important due to the large fraction that
transfers represent out of total revenues for municipalities and departamentos. In particular, while
there exist multiple channels through which the central government delivers resources to subnational
entities, the largest transfer is directed to pay for services in the provision of water, health and
education. Between 1993 and 2001, the transfers for these services were delivered though a program
called participaciones municipales and after 2001 through a program called Sistema General de
Participaciones (SGP). In the next paragraphs I discuss in detail both, the criteria to decide the
total amount of transfers under these programs and the criteria determining the allocation of funds
from these programs. Specifically, I find no link between the amount and rules in the allocation of
funds from these programs and the population thresholds used to allocate council size.
Table 6 reports the criteria used to determine the total amount of funds that municipalities
received through the participaciones municipales and SGP programs. In particular, under the old
program (participaciones municipales), the total amount of funds to be transfered was determined
as a fixed percentage of the current income of the central government. This lead to an accelerated
growth in the amount of transfers to municipalities and to an increase in the fiscal deficit of the
government (Sa´nchez and Pacho´n, 2013; Alesina et al., 2005). Because of this, the growth in transfers
through the SGP was set instead at an annual fixed rate.
Column (3) in Table 6 reports the breakdown of the funds. Notice that currently, 83% of
the total funds from the SGP are earmarked for the provision of education and health, up from 55%
under the old program.
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Moreover, column (4) list the criteria used to allocate funds to municipalities. Notice that
under the new program, different indicators are taken into account for each of the categories of
expenditures. In particular, while under both programs population has always been a criteria for
the allocation of funds, it is total population and not a discontinuous function of population that is
used to designate transfers.9
The only population threshold that I found affected the allocation of transfers from the SGP
was at 25,000 people. In particular, of the 5.4% of the SGP funds reserved for investments under the
category of general-purpose, 17% of these funds are allocated only among municipalities with less
than 25,000 people. The remaining 83% is then allocated across all municipalities. Notice that none
of the population thresholds used to allocate council size coincides with the 25,000 people threshold
(see Table 1.1 in the main text).
Moreover, municipalities differ in how much freedom they have in spending the resources
from the SGP. In particular, restrictions in the use of funds are done using the classification of
municipalities presented in Table 7. This classification ranks municipalities in terms of economic
importance according with two criteria, current revenues and population. Specifically, notice that
the population thresholds for municipalities in categories five and six are the same as two of the
population thresholds assigning council size. While this would suggest a confounded treatment, a
careful inspection of the law reveals that this is not the case. In particular, the law states that
municipalities meeting the revenue criterion but not the population criterion are able to move up
in the classification. However, municipalities meeting the population criterion but not the revenue
criterion are not able to move up. That is, the binding criterion for the classification of municipalities
is annual revenue and not population.
To guarantee that the revenue criterion is in fact being use to classify municipalities I
obtained the most recent classification from the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion. This entity
uses the classification to monitor the use of the transfers from the SGP by the municipalities and
is therefore a reliable source. Specifically, I find that as of 2016, 88% of the municipalities are
still classified in the sixth category of economic relevance. However, according with population
estimates, only 24% of the municipalities have populations below ten thousand people. That is, if
9I have not included the specific weight of each indicator under the SGP program because there have been continu-
ous changes in the number of indicators and the weight assigned to each indicator. However, from multiple phone-calls
with the Grupo de Financiamineto Territorial at the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, the entity that adminis-
ters the SGP, I know that population thresholds have never been used as a criteria in deciding the amount of transfers
to municipalities.
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the population criterion were to be used to classify municipalities we should observe almost 54% of
the municipalities in higher categories.
Royalties
Another source of transfers are royalties from natural resources. Historically, about 80% of
the royalties would be assigned to the municipalities and departamentos where the natural resources
were located, as well as the ports used to ship the commodities. The remaining 20% was allocated
through the Fondo Nacional de Regalias (FNR). These funds were earmarked for investment projects
related with the provision of energy and were awarded to municipalities that submitted valid project
proposals. Thus, these funds were not assigned using the population thresholds from Table 1.1.
In 2012 the FNR was replaced by the Sistema Nacional de Regalias (SNR). The new pro-
gram was established to redistribute more of the royalties away from to the municipalities and
departamentos were the natural resources are produced to the rest of municipalities in the country.
A.2 Salary of public officials
Eggers et al. (2015) observe that in France, Italy and Germany, population thresholds
determining council size also determine the wage of the mayor and other public officials. If true in
Colombia, this would posit a major problem for the identification of the effect of council size, not
only because of a confounded treatment but because it would introduce a strong incentive for public
officials to manipulate population estimates.
However, in Colombia the salary of the public officials is not determined by population
thresholds. Specifically, the salary of the mayors is approved every year by the council using limits
set by the central government on the maximum salary mayors can earn. The limit of the salary
varies with the classification of the municipality presented in Table 7. 10
Similarly, the honoraria earned per session by council members as well as the number of
sessions the council can held per year are both determined by laws 136 and 1368 of 1994 and
2009. Specifically, the law states that honoraria paid to council members depend on the economic
classification of the municipality as reported in Table 7. Thus, both the salary of the mayor and the
council vary according with the economic classification of the municipality. However, as explained
10Interestingly, I found an articles in Colombia’s newspaper (El Heraldo) describing a case were a council refused to
increase the salary of the mayor because of perceived poor performance. The mayor in turn argued that an increase
in salary was due because the municipality had moved up the latter from the 3rd to the 2nd category as a result of
an increase in municipal revenues. This story, while anecdotal, is consistent with the information I have collected.
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above, the classification of municipalities into the categories of economic relevance is done using the
current revenues of the municipality and not population.
To further test that this is the case, I have obtained information on the honoraria paid to
council members for the period 2006-2010. Using this information, I report in Figures 5 and 6, RD
plots for honoraria paid to the council and each council member, for each of the thresholds used in
my analysis. Notice that while we observe a positive discontinuity for total honoraria paid when
crossing the thresholds (due to an increase in council size), there is no evidence of a discontinuity
in honoraria paid per council member. These plots confirm that the law is being enforced and that
the classification of municipalities in terms of economic relevance, which determines honoraria per
council member, is determined only by current revenues of the municipalities.
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Table 6: Transfers to municipal governments for the provision of health, education, water, and basic services.
Period Growth in Transfers Earmarked for: Criteria to determine amount of transfers to Municipalities
Education: 30% 40% according with population living in poverty.
Health: 25% 20% according with poverty level relative to national average.
1993-2001
A percentage of the
current income
Potable Water and basic sanitation:
20%
22% according with share of national population in the municipality.
(Participaciones
Municipales)
of the Central
Government
Promotion of sports, culture and
recreation: 5%
6% according with fiscal performance (tax collection).
Free Investment: 20%
6% according with administrative performance (costs in the provision of
services).
6% according with improvements in the number of people living in poverty.
Education: 58.5%
Education: Depends on number of students enrolled and potential
students not enrolled yet.
Health: 24.5%
Health: Depends on population without access to health cre, equity, and
administrative efficiency.
2002 - Today (SGP)
Fixed growth rate +
inflation
Potable Water and basic sanitation:
11.6%
Water: Depends on population without access, population being attended,
municipal efforts to increase coverage, poverty level, fiscal and
administrative efficiency.
General Purpose: 5.4%
General Purpose: Depends on rural and urban population, relative
poverty, and fiscal and administrative efficiency.
Source: Bonet et al. (2014)
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Table 7: Classification of Municipalities according with their economic relevance
Category Current Revenue Population
Especial > 400,000 > 500,000
1st 100,001 - 400,000 100,001 - 500,000
2nd 50,001 - 100,000 50,001 - 100,000
3rd 30,001 - 50,000 30,001 - 50,000
4th 25,001 - 30,000 20,001 - 30,000
5th 15,001 - 25,000 10,001 - 20,000
6th < 15,000 ≤ 10,000
Source: Law 193 of 1994.
Note: Current revenue is expressed in monthly minimum wages.
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Figure 5: Honoraries paid to Council members (2006-2010)
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
ln
(h
on
or
ar
ie
s 
pa
id
 to
 th
e 
co
un
ci
l)
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
ln(population)
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
ln(honoraries paid to the council)
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
ln
(h
on
or
ar
ie
s 
pa
id
 to
 th
e 
co
un
ci
l)
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
ln(population)
3.8
3.9
4
4.1
4.2
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
ln(honoraries paid to the council)
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
ln
(h
on
or
ar
ie
s 
pa
id
 to
 th
e 
co
un
ci
l)
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
ln(population)
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
ln(honoraries paid to the council)
105
Figure 6: Honoraries paid per council member (2006-2010)
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